Abstract
This Symposium Article explores the origins and limits of the federal government¿s interstate quarantine power. In the event of a public health emergency, state and local political boundaries may generate self-interested measures that risk substantial harm to neighboring states. To more effectively stem a national epidemic and to better protect the interests of regional populations, should the federal government step in to override a state¿s protective quarantine? Neither current statutory authority nor how we have thought about it in the past prevents a greater national role. This Article shows how to expand our view of the federal government¿s interstate quarantine authority as an important tool to respond to public health threats affecting more than one state.
Recommended Citation
Polly J. Price,
Do State Lines Make Public Health Emergencies Worse? Federal Versus State Control of Quarantine,
67
Emory L. J.
491
(2018).
Available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol67/iss3/5