Abstract
This Article proposes the establishment of a ¿Federal Inaction Commission¿ (FIC). This new, independent agency would be charged with investigating and reviewing the inaction of Executive Branch agencies and reporting its findings and recommendations to elected officials and the public. The FIC would provide many of the same benefits that would result from increasing the availability of judicial review of non-enforcement decisions and other regulatory inaction. At the same time, the FIC would be in a position to minimize the practical disadvantages that have been identified with judicial review of such decisions. Not only would the establishment of the FIC therefore provide a more workable solution to the problem of agency inaction than other commentators have offered, but the agency would also provide a political solution to what the staunchest defenders of the status quo have maintained is solely a ¿political¿ problem.
Recommended Citation
Glen Staszewski,
The Federal Inaction Commission,
59
Emory L. J.
369
(2009).
Available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol59/iss2/3