Author ORCID Identifier
0009-0003-8399-0096
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2019
Keywords
Shareholders United Act, Securities regulation, Corporate political spending, Congress, Market risk
Abstract
Securities regulation has a way of crossing into other lanes. What public companies do is substantive regulation. How they govern themselves while doing it-or more importantly, how they disclose it-is securities regulation. So it is no surprise that the perennial concern over regulating money in politics should also become a question of federal securities regulation. The Shareholders United Act (the "Act")-passed by the House of Representatives as part of House Bill 1, an early, major piece of legislation in the 116th Congress-does just that. The Act would require that before engaging in political spending, public companies poll shareholders on how they want corporate political dollars to be spent, or not spent. It further bars public companies from political spending if they are majority owned by certain nonpartisan investors.
The Act offers an answer to the question as a matter of corporate democracy, what do shareholders need to know about how managers are spending resources on political advocacy? If enacted, however, it is unlikely to vindicate this or other shareholder interests. This Essay highlights legal and pragmatic issues with the Act. The core assumption it makes-that corporate political spending "speaks for" shareholders who need protecting-as well as the shareholder-polling mechanism it would require, risk running headlong into constitutional injunction. More, the polling mechanism it would require is impractical and inconsistent with the disclosure-based U.S. securities regulatory framework. As a better approach, if we are to address corporate political spending through securities regulation, the way forward is through the existing disclosure framework. Using this framework will not only help ensure that a securities-law response to corporate political spending survives constitutional challenge, but it will also be more effective at empowering shareholders to police political spending.
First Page
47
Publication Title
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
Recommended Citation
Andrew K. Jennings, Shareholders United?, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 47 (2019).
Included in
American Politics Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Securities Law Commons, Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Comments
© 2019 Andrew K. Jennings. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this provision and copyright notice.