Author ORCID Identifier
0000-0001-5816-6896
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2013
Keywords
Probabilistic standing, Value-based standing, Injury in fact, Federal courts, Supreme Court
Abstract
This Article argues in favor of standing based on expected value of harm. Standing doctrine has been constructed in a way that is oblivious to the idea of expected value. If people have suffered a loss with a positive expected value, they have suffered an "injury in fact." The incorporation of expected value into standing doctrine casts doubt on many of the Supreme Court's decisions in which it denies standing because the relevant injury is too "speculative" or is not "likely" to be redressed by a decree in the plaintiff's favor. This Article addresses this shortcoming in standing jurisprudence by proposing a theory of expected value-based standing. It argues that the Constitution presents no obstacle to expected value-based standing, that the "injury-in-fact" test requires only a positive expected value, and that the prudential barrier to generalized grievances is the sole obstacle to expected value-based standing.
First Page
1283
Publication Title
Michigan Law Review
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing's Expected Value, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1283 (2013).