Author ORCID Identifier

0000-0003-3068-0070

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2007

Keywords

Federal question jurisdiction, Supplemental jurisdiction, Centrality requirement, Article III, Supreme Court

Abstract

Article III authorizes and the Judicial Code grants federal subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases "arising under" federal law. The Supreme Court has interpreted these words differently, however, in their constitutional and statutory contexts. While the constitutional text is read broadly, the Court has imposed three limitations on the same words in the statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction: (1) the ''well-pleaded complaint" rule; (2) a requirement that the federal issues be sufficiently "direct" or "central', to the dispute to justify access to the federal courts; and (3) a requirement that the federal assertion be "substantial." These limitations are meant to filter those cases that should invoke lower federal court jurisdiction from those that should not.

My primary focus is the second limitation - the centrality requirement - which has long vexed courts and commentators. The Supreme Court sent conflicting signals regarding centrality in the first third of the twentieth century and then ignored the topic for fifty years. When it returned to the issue in 1986, in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, a sharply divided Court created more debate than certainty, particularly on the question of when (if ever) a state-created claim might invoke federal question jurisdiction. In 2005, the Court revisited the topic and issued a unanimous opinion in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. This case addresses significant questions and concerns raised by courts and commentators in the wake of Merrell Dow and throughout the Court's tortured treatment of the centrality requirement.

First Page

309

Publication Title

Indiana Law Journal

Comments

Copyright 2007 Richard D. Freer. All rights reserved.

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