Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute

Authors

Richard D. Freer, Emory University School of LawFollow

Author ORCID Identifier

0000-0003-3068-0070

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1991

Keywords

Supreme Court, Supplemental jurisdiction statute, Pendant parties, Statutory basis, Congressional intent

Abstract

It has been a tough couple of years for supplemental jurisdiction. In recent decades, the doctrine, which earlier had been called the "child of necessity and sire of confusion," had become somewhat less confusing. The Supreme Court created a flurry of concern over the future of the doctrine with a pair of restrictive decisions in the late 1970s, but showed no further interest; the lower courts generally interpreted those holdings narrowly. With exceptions in a couple of areas, the application of supple­mental jurisdiction in the various joinder situations became relatively clear and predictable, and the doctrine played a major role in the efficient pack­aging of litigation.

Then came the 1989 decision in Finley v. United States: Although re­quired only to address pendent parties jurisdiction (one of those few re­maining areas of uncertainty), the Supreme Court's broad language cast doubt on other long-settled and, frankly, more important areas of supple­mental jurisdiction. While many observers properly worried about the continued viability of supplemental jurisdiction, there is reason to believe that the lower courts would have dealt with the case as it had the opinions of the 1970s, basically limiting it to its facts.

Then came the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which became law on December 1, 1990. Had the statute simply overruled Finley and codified extant practice, which were its purported goals, it would have been a welcome addition to the federal jurisdiction family. Instead, it embodies a disquieting bias against diversity of citizenship jurisdiction that maims packaging in diversity cases. In addition, the statute also imposes an un­fortunate (and probably unintended) restriction on pendent parties juris­diction in alienage cases. Further, the statute is poorly drafted and cre­ates unnecessary confusion, even for situations as to which the rules had been clear and consistent. Although heralded as a "model of successful dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches," the supplemen­tal jurisdiction statute may well create as much confusion and uncertainty as is wrought by Finley.

First Page

445

Publication Title

Emory Law Journal

Recommended Citation

Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 Emory L. J. 445 (1991).