Consensus Decision-Making: Decision-Making Model of Chinese Constitutional Review

Authors

• Songfeng Li

Abstract

The judgment model of constitutional review in China adopts a consensus-based judgment model involving multiple stakeholders, including review authorities, drafting authorities, relevant interest parties, and the general public. Through multi-level, multi-stage, and multi-round interactive communication and negotiation, consensus is reached on constitutional judgments. This judgment model aligns with the power division political system under the NPC system, reflecting the institutional concept of people’s sovereignty and the cultural foundation of valuing harmony. It is also a result of the decentralization of constitutional review authority leading to insufficient power for actual reviewers, the parallel nature of factual and normative judgments in constitutional review, and the ambiguity of constitutional review standards. However, consensus-based judgment may lead to issues such as the softening of review authority, increased vagueness of review standards, and escalating review costs. Therefore, it is necessary to regulate the implementation of consensus-based judgment through processes of open communication and negotiation, detailing the constitutional reasons for review judgments, and establishing mechanisms such as “Friends of Constitutional Review” to provide channels for public participation.

Recommended Citation

Songfeng Li, Consensus Decision-Making: Decision-Making Model of Chinese Constitutional Review, 40 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 345 (2026).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol40/iss2/4