Emory International Law Review
Abstract
How is prosecutorial independence lost? How does a prosecution system’s design affect its political independence? This Article analyzes the inner workings of South Korea’s Prosecutors’ Office, which adheres to the Continental European style of prosecutorial organization and independence that emphasizes mechanisms of bureaucratic accountability for prosecutors. Based on interviews with prosecutors, police, judges, lawyers, scholars, and activists, it shows how independence is lost in three key areas of prosecutorial activity: personnel policy, investigations, and charging decisions. This article argues that aspects of the Continental tradition make prosecutors vulnerable to politicization.
Personnel policy has selected prosecutors meritocratically at young ages, trained them intensively within the organization, and promoted prosecutors based on seniority and merit, in principle. Investigations and charging decisions are meticulously overseen by higher-ranked veteran prosecutors. Certain elite prosecutorial divisions have historically specialized in political cases, namely the “special investigations” and “public security” departments. The centralized, hierarchical system for supervising prosecutors in theory establishes rational management and quality-control over prosecutors. In reality, however, these mechanisms allow the upper echelons of the prosecutorial bureaucracy, and the politicians that appoint them, to exercise firm political control over the entire system. In particular, the promotion system, by dangling opportunities for career success before prosecutors, molds their mentalities and encourages them to gratify their superiors’ wishes. Korean presidents have also customarily employed prosecutors within the Presidential Office (the “Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs” being the leading example) and used them to manipulate political investigations.
With regards to prosecutorial independence theory, this Article offers a case study of how the concept’s Continental style functions and how mechanisms of bureaucratic accountability can sometimes fail to protect against politicization. This Article is the second in a series. The first Article explains the history and doctrine of the Continental style in Korea, while the final Article provides an account of reform discourse and recent changes.
Recommended Citation
Neil Chisholm,
Prosecutorial Independence Lost: How Prosecutorial Bureaucracy is Politicized in South Korea,
38
Emory Int'l L. Rev.
585
(2024).
Available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol38/iss3/2