Do the Decision-Making Mechanisms in the EU Undermine Member States' National Interest?: A Case Study of the Sanctions Regime

Authors

Melanie C. Papadopoulos

Abstract

Following the shocking results of the Brexit referendum in June 2016 and the Greek referendum rejecting austerity measures in 2015, many believe that the EU is undergoing a legitimacy crisis. The most vocal Eurosceptics claim that the EU threatens individual Member State sovereignty, with the chief concern being that the EU's decision-making mechanisms are leaving certain Member States overruled in major decisions. This Comment explores the decision-making mechanisms employed at the supranational level of the EU, with a particular focus on the EU's sanctions regime, revealing the heart of the struggle between efficiency in decision-making and preservation of national sovereignty. This Comment concludes that the safeguards in place in the founding treaties are flawed, but there are solutions available to improve the decision-making process in the sanctions regime.

Recommended Citation

Melanie C. Papadopoulos, Do the Decision-Making Mechanisms in the EU Undermine Member States' National Interest?: A Case Study of the Sanctions Regime, 31 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 553 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol31/iss4/3