State Interest as the Main Impetus for U.S. Antitrust Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Restraint Through Prescriptive Comity

Authors

Daniel Lim

Abstract

The 21st century saw a rapid surge in competition law legislation and enforcement, resulting in higher fines and penalties. Beginning with the United States, many states began to actively seek extraterritorial application of domestic competition laws against foreign entities. This has negative implications for smaller economies that lack the motive and ability to enforce competition laws. This Comment argues that competition law was formed and developed according to strong domestic economic interests that do not take into consideration the interests of smaller foreign economies that could potentially be harmed by the extraterritorial application of competition law by other states. This Comment proposes that the U.S. Courts, Congress, and competition authorities revisit the principle of international comity laid out by Justice Scalia's dissent in Timberlane to prevent competition law from becoming a protectionist tool that protects its domestic interests at the expense of the economic growth of smaller economies.

Recommended Citation

Daniel Lim, State Interest as the Main Impetus for U.S. Antitrust Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Restraint Through Prescriptive Comity, 31 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 415 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol31/iss3/3