Document Type
Essay
Publication Title
Emory Int'l L. Rev. Recent Dev.
Publication Date
Spring 1-1-2017
Abstract
Professor Byrnes offers a preliminary narrative to examine the serious challenge of Control Firsters' vision that every jurisdiction should have complete information on all transactions by any taxpayer. A question that Control Firsters must address is whether it is prudent for taxpayers to trust the governments of the 117 countries that scored a fifty or below on Transparency International's corruption index. Quite possibly, the complete information system invoked by Control Firsters encourages, even prolongs, the bad behavior by providing fuel (financial information) to feed the fire of corruption and suppression of rivals. In light of this, Professor Byrnes recommends that the United States leverage a 'carrot-stick' policy tool to incentivize bad actors to adopt best tax administration practices by offering reciprocal automatic exchange of information via the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Competent Authority Agreements.
Volume
31
First Page
1033
Recommended Citation
William Byrnes,
How May the United States Leverage Its FATCA IGA Bilateral Process To Incentivize Good Tax Administrations Among the World of Black Hat and Grey Hat Governments?: A Carrot & Stick Policy Proposal,
31
Emory Int'l L. Rev. Recent Dev.
1033
(2017).
Available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr-recent-developments/13