Document Type
Perspective
Publication Title
Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev. Perspectives
Publication Date
1-1-2016
Abstract
Exploring whether corporate governance requires companies to monitor the ways in which executives increase profits, Sapna Jain examines whether there are solutions to allow rule breaking or policies to deter illegal behavior. She explores how the broad definition of corporate governance may not correlate with the business principles of striving to increase profits and how rule breaking might be allowed. As the boundaries of rule breaking may lead to slippery slopes, Jain analyzes food and drug law policies that could impose criminal and civil penalties on executives. Lastly, Jain investigates the option of reducing profits to ensure complete compliance. After comparing these options, Jain highlights the difficulty in proving inappropriate executive behavior and the issue of enforcement due to increased costs and limited resources.
First Page
2058
Volume
3
Recommended Citation
Sapna Jain,
Who Is Responsible for How Executives Behave?,
3
Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev. Perspectives
2058
(2016).
Available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar-perspectives/27