The common statement that there are two different regulatory systems concerning the mandatory takeover rule – the market rule system and the equal opportunity system – is, in practice, overly simplistic: facing the choice between freedom and strict regulation on whether the control premium should be proportionally shared with all non-controlling shareholders, some jurisdictions have adopted a hybrid solution. The Brazilian mandatory takeover rule (re)approved in 2001 is a good example. This paper will comprehensively analyse the Brazilian and European rules on mandatory takeover bids, using empirical data about the Brazilian markets and details of various cases that tested the limits of the existing regulation.
Jorge Brito Pereira,
An Ocean Apart: The Mandatory Takeover Rule in Brazil and in Europe,
Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar/vol10/iss1/3