Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review
Abstract
In the wake of the Great Recession, has the Justice Department neglected its duty to prosecute officers of financial institutions, or are prosecutorial options insufficient under current law? This piece examines the question posed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff. Rule 10b-5 could allow for prosecution involving misbranded AAA-rated collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), or improperly influenced the credit rating agencies both of which contributed to the collapse of 2008. Exploring this issue, Michael Wiseman's piece examines the effect of deferred or non-prosecution agreements by the U.S. Department of Justice. This piece also explores efforts by congress to impose quasi-strict liability, embodied in the Sabranes-Oxley Act and the Volker Rule, on high-level corporate office in bank fraud cases.
Recommended Citation
Michael Wiseman,
Judge Rakoff, the Justice Department, and Corporate Crime: Lack of Will or Lack of Cause?,
1
Emory Corp. Governance & Accountability Rev.
81
(2014).
Available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar/vol1/iss1/11