CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S MISSTEP AROUND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.

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CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S MISSTEP AROUND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.

INTRODUCTION

In Richard Wagner’s opera Lohengrin, a knight appears at the prayers of a maiden to defend her against accusations of murder. The knight agrees to wed her on the condition that she never ask his name or from whence he came. As such, when Judge Friendly called the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) a “legal Lohengrin,” he was referencing the peculiar origin and nature of this aged statute. Although we are well aware of the origins of the ATS, its inactivity for almost 200 years clouded it in an aura of mystery. Now, almost thirty years after its revival by the Second Circuit, that same court may have stripped the ATS of its ability to defend its maiden, the victims of tortious actions attributable to corporate entities.

The ATS has eluded much appellate review due to settlements and quick dismissals. The Supreme Court has seriously considered its jurisdictional grant in only one case. As such, there remains much mystery about its exact function and application. By requiring that courts look to the corpus of international law to determine jurisdiction, the ATS opens the door to judicial conjecture and confusion on the content of the “law of nations.” Although the recognition of what constitutes substantive international law rules (such as standards for torture, extrajudicial killings, or forced exile) is a difficult enough task for the lower courts of the federal judiciary, the scope of those rules, such as their source, has equally led to conflict among the courts.

2 See id. at 55–56.
3 See id. at 57–58.
5 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
It is this conflict of scope that gave rise to the Second Circuit’s September 2010 holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.\(^8\) The Second Circuit, with no briefing of the issue from the parties, reversed an assumption underlying many ATS decisions against corporations up to that point: that the ATS provided subject matter jurisdiction over actions against corporate entities.\(^9\) The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Nigerian plaintiffs’ claims alleging human rights atrocities committed in connection with protests over the defendant corporation’s oil extraction activities.\(^10\) On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this dismissal.\(^11\)

The Second Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS is not available for actions against corporations.\(^12\) In doing so, the court almost exclusively looked to one source of international law—custom.\(^13\) Yet, the Statute for the International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”),\(^14\) recognized as the authority for the sources of international law,\(^15\) lists another important and especially pertinent source: “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”\(^16\) As this Comment shows, the Second Circuit’s failure to implement this source of international law is a fatal blow to its holding.

This Comment, in Part I, first looks to the history of the ATS and the case law leading up to the holding in Kiobel. Next, in Part II, the facts of this case are discussed, followed by an analysis of both the majority and concurring opinions. Part III contains a discussion of the general principles of international law as stated in the ICJ Statute, leading to a survey of the world’s legal systems in Part IV and their treatment of corporations and the imposition of tort liability. From this, Part V applies the general principles discovered from these legal systems through an analysis of the majority and concurring

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\(^8\) Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111.
\(^9\) Id. at 145. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the question dealing with corporate liability under the ATS is one that goes to the merits or is jurisdictional. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491). This issue will be discussed more thoroughly infra Part V.D.
\(^11\) Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149.
\(^12\) Id.
\(^13\) Id. at 125–45.
\(^15\) DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 13 (2d ed. 2006); see also ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1).
\(^16\) ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c).
opinions, a look to the Second Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, and a
discussion of the dual issues certified by the Supreme Court when it granted
certiorari in Kiobel. Finally, Part VI concludes the Comment with a discussion
of alternatives to the Second Circuit’s bright-line denial of ATS jurisdiction
over corporations, the potential implications of the decision as it stands, and
best alternatives to which the Second Circuit could have looked when deciding
Kiobel.

I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

Included in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS states: “The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
Thus, plaintiffs looking to overcome the ATS’s jurisdictional barrier must be
aliens suing in tort for a violation of the law of nations. Unlike other sources of
original federal court jurisdiction, the ATS does not look to the relationship
between the parties, nor to the source of the conflict in federal law, but
asserts its power under the auspices of international law. This reference to
international law, on its face, creates clear and unavoidable choice of law and
separation of powers issues, among others. Additionally, there is a general
difficulty raised when municipal courts must construe and apply international
law.

Despite the ATS’s potential to raise these complex issues, it lay relatively
dormant for almost 200 years. It was awakened by the Second Circuit in

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17 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); accord Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. Some courts have also
referred to the ATS as the Alien Tort Claims Act or the ATCA. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 943
(9th Cir. 2002); Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
The Supreme Court has used ATS, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004), and, on this basis, this
Comment references the statute in the same manner.


20 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 286 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring)
(“Lacking the benefit of clear guidance, I presume a federal court should resort to its traditional source, the
federal common law, when deriving the standard.”); Unocal, 395 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“I do
not agree that the question of Unocal’s tort liability should be decided by applying any international law test at
all. . . [It] should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort principles.”). But see Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (noting
that the scope of international law is defined by international law itself).

21 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885–89 (2d Cir. 1980).


23 See Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2007). Before its revival in 1980, the ATS
established jurisdiction in two cases, Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), and Bolchos v. Darrel, 3
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a decision which created a doctrine that has become “a touchstone for promoting effective remedies for serious human rights violations.” In Filartiga, two citizens of Paraguay brought an action to recover for the death of a family member by torture at the hands of a former Inspector General of Police. The trial court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds; the Second Circuit interpreted the trial court’s dismissal as reflecting that, although “official torture violates an emerging norm of customary international law,” the trial court felt “constrained by dicta” to construe the ATS as excluding law governing the relations between a state and its citizens. The Second Circuit disagreed. Reviving the little-used ATS, the majority looked to domestic court opinions, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and even municipal constitutions to hold that “official” torture is “unambiguous[ly]” and “clear[ly]” prohibited by the law of nations.

Filartiga was a groundbreaking decision and victory for human rights. Since that case was decided, the ATS has substantially protected victims and
provided civil judgments against those who violate “sufficiently and constitutionally defined” human rights norms. Yet, the ATS’s reach was subsequently judicially limited. In *Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.*, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns was not secured by the ATS, but instead that the sole basis for jurisdiction in these cases was to be controlled by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Notwithstanding this limitation, the use of the ATS in actions against private individuals has been bolstered by the courts. In *Amerada Hess*, the Supreme Court stated: “The Alien Tort Statute by its terms does not distinguish among classes of defendants.” Further, in *Kadic v. Karadžić*, the Second Circuit held “that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.” Yet, in the history of ATS litigation, the concept of liability for the private corporate person was not confronted in such a direct manner as it was in *Kiobel*.

The issue of corporate liability under the ATS has been pursued by plaintiffs under the theory of aiding and abetting liability. This approach has led to confusion and conflict in the courts over the specific standards for corporate aiding and abetting liability and acts as a prelude to the holding in *Kiobel*. In *Doe I v. Unocal Corp.*, “one of the most learned discussions of...
aiding and abetting liability under the ATS, the Ninth Circuit judges were split on the definition and source of law for the aiding and abetting claims. Although holding that the case could continue against Unocal, the majority held that international law supplied the applicable legal standard, while Judge Reinhardt found the cause of action in domestic law. The Second Circuit perpetuated this conflict in *Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.* with Judge Katzmann’s concurrence engaging in an analysis of international law tribunals and agreements to find the relevant standard, while Judge Hall argued for the application of domestic law. Khulumani’s remaining concurring opinion could be considered the direct precursor to the majority reasoning in *Kiobel*. Concluding that the scope of the ATS, as defined by international law, did not cover actions against corporate defendants, Judge Korman drew upon footnote language of the Supreme Court in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*.

*Sosa* is one of a short line of cases in which the Supreme Court has given guidance to the lower courts handling ATS litigation. The plaintiff in *Sosa* was a Mexican physician accused of aiding in the torture of a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agent. After failed attempts to arrest Alvarez-Machain with the help of the Mexican government, the DEA hired a group of Mexican nationals to abduct and transport him to the United States to stand trial. Following termination of the criminal case, Alvarez-Machain brought a civil action under the ATS for arbitrary arrest and detention as a violation of

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45 *Unocal*, 395 F.3d at 945 (“[A]ll torts alleged in the present case are jus cogens violations and, thereby, violations of the law of nations.”).
46 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“The ancillary legal question of Unocal’s third-party tort liability should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort principles, such as agency, joint venture, or reckless disregard.”).
47 *Khulumani*, 504 F.3d 254.
48 Id. at 270–78 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring) (“To derive a standard of accessorial liability, however, a federal court should consult the federal common law.”).
50 Id. at 312 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Whether . . . there [is] a well established and universally recognized international norm providing for liability of private parties who aid and abet apartheid.”).
51 Id. at 321 (“The sources evidencing the relevant norms of international law at issue plainly do not recognize such liability.”).
52 Id. at 311; see also *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
53 *Sosa*, 542 U.S. at 697–98.
54 Id. at 698.
the law of nations. Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision, the Supreme Court sought to “clarify the scope of . . . the ATS.”

In doing so, the Court made two key holdings. First, the Court held that the ATS was a jurisdictional statute that does not, of itself, create a cause of action. Although seemingly a victory for the defendant (and the United States, which argued the same point), the Court refused to accept the notion that Congress intended the ATS “to be placed on the shelf” until they enacted subsequent legislation creating causes of action. From this holding, important questions arise: Which causes of action for acts alleged to be violations of the law of nations are realized under the ATS, and thus, in the municipal law of the United States? How should the lower courts recognize new actions in the ever-evolving arena of international law, if at all?

The answers to these questions constitute the Court’s second key holding in Sosa. The Court held that to recognize a violation of the law of nations sufficient to trigger the ATS’s jurisdictional grant, it must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.” Clearly, this grant gives the lower courts substantial discretionary power, which Justice Scalia argued in concurrence was “illegitimate.” The majority was not blind to the concern that district courts would be too loose in their recognition of international law norms. Justice Scalia argued that the “door” that leads to the creation of law under the auspices of a jurisdictional grant was closed by events after the enactment of

55 Id. at 698–99.
56 Id. at 699.
57 Id. at 712.
58 Id. at 719.
59 Interestingly, the holding had been alluded to in prior case law. In Filartiga, the Second Circuit equated the torturer with the pirate, referencing one of the three previously and sufficiently defined violations of international law existing when the ATS was passed, vesting federal courts with universal jurisdiction. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). In 1789, when the ATS was passed, Blackstone had already identified three defined violations of the law of nations: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1769). Also, in Amerada Hess, the Second Circuit stated in dicta, “Where the attacker has refused to compensate the neutral, such action is analogous to piracy, one of the earliest recognized violations of international law,” again referencing piracy as an established violation of the law of nations. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1987), rev’d, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
60 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
61 Id. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argues that the decision gives “the Federal Judiciary . . . a task it is neither authorized nor suited to perform.” Id. at 739.
the ATS (most notably, *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*)⁶².⁶³ Responding to this, the majority employed some of the most cited language in ATS litigation post-*Sosa*: “[C]onsiderations persuade us that the judicial power [to recognize violations of the law of nations] should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”⁶⁴

*Sosa* thus gave the lower courts the much-needed guidance to establish jurisdiction under the ATS. Yet, the Court also injected uncertainty in another area of contention in a footnote: “A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a *corporation* or individual.”⁶⁵ With this, the Court created issues of whether international law itself defined the scope of the “law of nations”⁶⁶ and whether that scope would stretch to cover corporations allegedly violating international law. The Second Circuit provided a resolution to these issues in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.*

II. *KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.*

A. *Facts and Procedural History*

The facts of *Kiobel* arose from a conflict between the Ogoni people of Nigeria and the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (“SPDC”).⁶⁷ This company is a subsidiary of and wholly owned by Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (“RDPC”) and Shell Transport and Trading Company.⁶⁸ The Ogoni region consists of approximately 400 square miles in

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⁶² *Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
⁶³ *Sosa*, 542 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The general common law was the old door. We do not close that door today, for the deed was done in *Erie*.”); see also *Erie*, 304 U.S. at 78–80.
⁶⁴ *Sosa*, 542 U.S. at 729.
⁶⁵ *Id.* at 732 n.20 (emphasis added).
⁶⁸ *Id.*
southern Nigeria. In 1956, oil was discovered in the Ogoni region and, in 1958, SPDC began oil production in this area.

Since the discovery, oil and gas have become vital sources of revenue for Nigeria. Ninety-seven percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange revenues and 79.5% of government revenues come from the oil and gas sectors. Moreover, the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation is involved in the “joint venture” with SPDC, owning fifty-five percent of the venture. Because of the oil extraction, the Ogoni people have watched as the region has been decimated and ravaged by the extraction process, oil spills, and gas flaring—the act of lighting excess gas from oil wells as waste, acknowledged as “extremely wasteful and environmentally damaging.”

In 1990, the Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (“MOSOP”) was formed to stage nonviolent protests against SPDC operations because of the environmental damage. In 1992, MOSOP demanded compensation for the environmental damage and, by 1993, more than half of the Ogoni population participated in MOSOP protests. According to the allegations, SPDC enlisted the help of Nigerian military officials to quell the protests, and the Nigerian military forces attacked and looted Ogoni villages and raped and killed the residents. A month later, a Nigerian military commander wrote in a “restricted” memo that “Shell operations [are] still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to

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71 Id. at 12.
72 Id. at 14–16.
73 Id. at 18.
75 See Ogoni Bill of Rights, supra note 69, at 3, 7 (noting that in 1991 there were approximately 500,000 Ogoni people; demanding restitution for “the flaring of gas, oil spillages, oil blow-outs, etc.”); Events, MOVEMENT FOR SURVIVAL OGNONI PEOPLE, http://www.mosop.org/events.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (noting that more than 300,000 Ogoni people attended Ogoni Day on January 4, 1993).
commence,” the Ogoni plaintiffs allege that the letter announced that “wasting operations” would be conducted during MOSOP protests. The allegations also state that the military leader further instructed that “pressure” was to be exerted on Shell for “prompt regular inputs” to support military operations.

Throughout these happenings, it is alleged that Dr. Barinem Kiobel, a member of the Executive Council for the state encompassing Ogoni, opposed the use of violence in the region. In May 1994, he received a letter from the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus outlining safety concerns for the Ogoni population and requested that Dr. Kiobel “do everything in [his] power” to prevent human rights violations. Plaintiffs allege that Kiobel forwarded the memo to military officials. Further allegations state that two weeks later, Kiobel was invited to attend a meeting concerning an upcoming constitutional convention—necessitated by the seizure of Nigerian power by General Sani Abacha. Plaintiffs allege that while Kiobel was elsewhere, taking care of other business, the meeting degenerated and four Ogoni elders were killed. Allegations also state that Kiobel and eight other Ogoni activists, including MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa, were later arrested, detained, and subsequently tortured; these nine people came to be known as the “Ogoni Nine.”

Allegations regarding the detention state that the conditions for Dr. Kiobel and the rest of the Ogoni Nine were “brutal,” involving beatings and denial of basic medical care and food. Plaintiffs allege that during this time, no charges were filed against Dr. Kiobel. Allegedly, in November 1994, the Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal (“CDST”) was created to administer “extra-

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78 Id. at 189–90 (Leval, J., concurring).
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Id. ¶ 56.
82 Id. ¶ 60.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. ¶ 61.
87 Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 79, ¶¶ 69–70.
88 See id. ¶ 65.
judicial” sentences on those deemed to be “threats to public order.”

Plaintiffs allege that this tribunal convicted Dr. Kiobel of murder and he, along with the rest of the Ogoni Nine, was executed after a sham trial.

Twelve residents of Ogoni sued RDPC, inter alia, for their complicity in violations of international law, alleging extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and crimes against humanity in September 2002. Although concluding that aiding and abetting liability is permissible under Sosa, the district court held that extrajudicial killings, property destruction, forced exile, and violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association were not sufficiently well defined to constitute a violation of the law of nations, and thus, vest courts with subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS. Yet, the district court also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against humanity; and torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Recognizing that this case raises several controlling questions of law that provide “substantial ground for difference of opinion,” Judge Wood certified the questions presented for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit.

B. Majority Opinion

Kiobel’s majority first recognized that, because appellate review of cases under the ATS has been uncommon, many issues surrounding the jurisdiction granted by the statute have remained unresolved. The issue presented here is one of those lacunae in ATS litigation, namely, “[d]oes the jurisdiction granted by the ATS extend to civil actions brought against corporations under the law

89 Id. ¶ 3.
90 See id. ¶ 3, 74. Petitioners allege multiple due process failures in the CDST trial, including detention without charges, interference with meetings between counsel and the accused, threats of physical violence against defense counsel, and provision of false testimony against the accused through bribes. See id. ¶¶ 3, 67–69.
93 Id. at 468.
94 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
96 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116–17 (“Thus, our Court has published only nine significant decisions on the ATS since 1980 (seven of the nine coming in the last decade), and the Supreme Court in its entire history has decided only one ATS case.”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
97 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117.
of nations? The majority answered this question in two parts. First, the court considered the body of law that governs the scope of ATS litigation: international law or domestic law. Concluding that international law governs the analysis and scope, the court then looked to the sources of international law to “reveal” whether corporations can be subject to liability under the statute.

To prove that international law governs the scope of ATS litigation, the majority quickly looked to the treatment of the subjects of international law. Relying for the first of many times on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (“Nuremburg Trials”)—which was definitive in stating that individual liability can attach for private individuals’ international law violations—to prove that these subjects are defined by international law itself, the court held that the subjects of international law were defined by international law. To further vindicate the necessity of the foregoing analysis, the court took guidance from footnote 20 of Sosa, where the Supreme Court stated that a question to be answered by the lower courts was whether international law extends its scope over non-state juridical entities such as corporations. The court stated that to answer this question, it has long followed the practice of scope-determination with reference to international law, beginning with the rejuvenation of ATS in Filartiga. To support this, the majority looked to Khulumani, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., Kadic v. Karadžić, and Judge Edward’s concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. The majority claimed that this is not an unusual analysis, that “[t]here is no principled basis for treating

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98 Id. at 117.
99 Id. at 125–31.
100 Id. at 131–45.
101 Subjects of international law are “those that, to varying extents, have legal status, personality, rights, and duties under international law and whose acts and relationships are the principal concerns of international law.” Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States pt. II, intro. note, at 70 (1987) (emphasis added).
102 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126–27.
104 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128 (“In Filartiga, we had looked to international law to determine our jurisdiction and to delineate the type of defendant who could be sued.”).
105 Id.; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring).
106 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009).
107 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995).
108 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
the question of corporate liability differently,” and thus, this holding should be unsurprising.\textsuperscript{109}

The majority then moved to the second, and more controversial, holding that corporate liability is not sufficiently well defined to be a norm of international law. The court recognized the primacy of the sources of international law as identified in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and reproduced part of Article 38.\textsuperscript{110} Attempting to delineate the norm of corporate liability in international law, the court separated the analysis into an investigation of international tribunals, international treaties, and works of publicists.\textsuperscript{111} Curiously missing from this analysis was an investigation into “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a clearly stated source of international law in the ICJ Statute.\textsuperscript{112}

Investigating international tribunals, the court again heavily relied on the Nuremburg Trials and the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (“London Charter”),\textsuperscript{113} establishing them as the “single most important source of modern customary international law concerning liability for violations of fundamental human rights.”\textsuperscript{114} The London Charter granted jurisdiction over “persons . . . whether as individuals or as members of organizations.”\textsuperscript{115} Yet, it also allowed the tribunal to classify organizations as criminal.\textsuperscript{116} This notion seemingly detracts from the court’s eventual conclusion, but the majority avoids this problem

\textsuperscript{109} Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130.

\textsuperscript{110} Id. at 132; see also ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38.

\textsuperscript{111} Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132–45. The Second Circuit primarily focused on their investigation of custom. As for treaties, the court did indeed find treaties that would hold corporations civilly liable for international law violations. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138. The court rejected them as insufficient evidence of custom either because they have not been ratified by the states upon which the greatest impact would be had or because they are specially tuned to specific subject matter. Id. at 138 & n.40; see, e.g., Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 10(1), done Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. 13127; Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 2, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43 (Dec. 17, 1997). As for publicists, the majority and the ICJ Statute relegate them to a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(d); accord Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 142. Relying on two professors who testified in front of the court, the majority concluded, “customary international law does not recognize liability for corporations that violate its norms.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 143.

\textsuperscript{112} ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c). The court does speak to this in footnote 43. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43. A further discussion of this terse dismissal of the authority of general principles appears later in this Comment. See infra notes 135–43 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{113} Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter London Charter].

\textsuperscript{114} Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132–33.

\textsuperscript{115} London Charter, supra note 113, art. 6.

\textsuperscript{116} Id. art. 9.
because the authority to determine the criminality of organizations was “merely to facilitate the prosecution of individuals who were members of the organization.”

To illustrate this point, the court recounted the treatment of the I.G. Farben chemical company.

For their complicity and active participation in the atrocities occurring at Auschwitz and their support of the Nazi regime, twenty-four executives of Farben were charged with various crimes including “planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other countries” and “slavery and mass murder.” The corporation was not charged or named in the indictment. The Nuremberg Court explained in now-famous language: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”

The Second Circuit moves from the Nuremberg Trials to other international tribunals since Nuremberg. They examine the jurisdictional statutes for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). Both ICTY and ICTR expressly limited jurisdiction to “natural persons.” Moreover, the court relies on negotiations during the creation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) —to which the United States is not a party—that rejected proposals to impose corporate criminal liability. Thus, from their investigation of the

117 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 134 (emphasis omitted).
118 *Id*. at 134–36.
119 7 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 14, 50 (1953); see also *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 135.
120 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 136–37.
122 ICTR Statute, supra note 122, art. 5 (“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present statute.”); ICTY Statute, supra note 122, art. 6 (“The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute.”).
123 Rome Statute, supra note 122.
124 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 137; see also Rome Statute, supra note 122, art. 25(1) (“The [International Criminal] Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”); Albin Eser, *Individual
Nuremberg Trials and other modern international tribunals, the majority concluded that corporate liability has not yet been sufficiently well defined by these tribunals or by international law to have ripened into a norm of customary international law. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, dismissed the remaining claims, and held that “customary international law does not recognize liability for corporations that violate its norms.”

Before moving on to the lengthy concurring opinion, two important points are notable. First, the majority spends part of its introductory statements and a whole section of reasoning discussing its points of disagreement with the concurrence. During the introduction, the majority mentions that it “do[es] not take lightly the passion with which Judge Leval disagrees with [its] holding” and then proceeds to cite to every page in the concurring opinion during which Judge Leval calls the majority reasoning “illogical,” “strange,” and “internally inconsistent.” Then, after their primary analysis of the case, the majority outlines four major points of disagreement with the concurrence, consuming approximately three pages of its twenty-four page opinion.

Briefly, the majority contends that Judge Leval inappropriately shifts the burden to the court to find a norm of custom that justifies their ruling. Contrarily, the majority says that the burden to show a custom must be on those attempting to invoke it. Second, it disagrees that a significant distinction exists between the imposition of criminal and civil liability in international law. Third, the majority contends that Judge Leval distorts its holding by stating that corporations are never liable under international law for violations of the law of nations. Finally, its disagrees that this case is

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106 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137.
107 Id. at 143.
108 Id. at 122.
109 Id. at 145–48.
110 Id. at 146.
111 Id.
112 Id. The court cites to Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in Khulumani: “[I]nternational law does not maintain [a] kind of hermetic seal between criminal and civil law.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113 Id. at 147.
“merely a question of remedy to be determined independently by each state.”

The second notable point is the majority’s treatment of general principles of law as a source of international law. In a footnote, the majority writes that general principles, as outlined in the ICJ Statute, are a subsidiary means of determining international law. It supports this statement by citing to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and works of publicists. Further, they cite Judge Friendly in *IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.*, who wrote:

> We cannot subscribe to plaintiffs’ view that the Eighth Commandment “Thou shalt not steal” is part of the law of nations. While every civilized nation doubtless has this as a part of its legal system, a violation of the law of nations arises only when there has been “a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings *inter se*.”

This terse dismissal of general principles of law is especially curious considering that the majority reproduces the text of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute in full (including Subsection (c) which lists general principles as a source of international law), states that the Second Circuit has “long recognized” the ICJ sources as “authoritative . . . sources of international law,” and proceeds to structure their argument around custom, treaties, and works of publicists.

C. Concurring Opinion

Judge Leval wrote the concurring opinion. Because of the opinion’s length, this Comment proceeds by examining Judge Leval’s five major points: (1) the

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134 *Id.*
136 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43.
138 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43.
139 *Id.*
141 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 132.
142 *Id.*
143 See *id.* at 134–45.
creation of a rule versus the absence of a rule; (2) the question of remedy; (3) criminal versus civil liability in international law; (4) the potential for abuse told through hypothetical situations; and (5) the justification for dismissal.

First and most important is the difference in the characterization of the court’s holding between the majority and the concurrence. The majority is explicit in saying that they looked to customary international law to “reveal” what it has to say about corporate liability and whether such a norm exists. Conversely, the concurrence characterizes the majority holding as a new “rule” of international law. Whereas the majority views its analysis as deciphering the custom of nations, the concurrence characterizes it as creating a new rule that exempts corporations from the strictures of international law. This difference reveals a deeper conflict between the views of the majority and concurrence of how to apply customary international law.

The concurrence sees the absence of any norm imposing corporate liability as a grant of authority to the individual states to determine the remedy for violations of international norms, the second main point of the concurring opinion. According to Judge Leval, civil liability for violations of international norms “is awarded in U.S. courts because the law of nations has outlawed certain conduct, leaving it to each State to resolve questions of civil liability, and the United States has chosen through the ATS to impose civil liability.”

Continuing the concept that the issue of remedy is to be left to the states themselves, Judge Leval notes that no international tribunal exists with a

144 Id. at 125 ("[W]e consider what the sources of international law reveal with respect to whether corporations can be subject to liability for violations of customary international law.").
145 Id. at 149 (Leval, J., concurring). Throughout the opinion and in the point headings, Judge Leval refers to the “rule” of the majority.
146 Id. at 151 ("The corporation, according to my colleagues, has not violated international law, and is indeed incapable of doing so because international law does not apply to the conduct of corporations.").
147 The majority reasoned that the absence of any norm that supports corporate liability is the exact proof that no such norm exists and, thus, no subject matter jurisdiction can be maintained under the law of nations and the ATS. Id. at 147 (majority opinion) ("We hold that corporate liability is not a norm that we can recognize and apply in actions under the ATS because the customary international law of human rights does not impose any form of liability on corporations (civil, criminal, or otherwise).").
148 Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
149 Id. at 175. Moreover, if international law were to have a rule exempting corporations from liability (as the concurrence characterizes the majority holding), that rule would have to be found in customary international law and be sufficiently well defined. See id. at 164.
structure to carry the jurisdiction consistent with the majority’s rule.\textsuperscript{150} No international tribunal “has ever had jurisdiction to consider a private civil remedy of any kind—either against a natural person or a juridical entity.”\textsuperscript{151} Moreover, if the remedy for violations of international law is not to be decided by the states, then it follows that international law does not recognize liability for natural persons either. The conclusion that no custom recognizes civil corporate liability merely follows from the idea that there is “no rule of international law making any private person civilly liable . . . . If the absence of widespread agreement in the world as to civil liability bars imposing liability on corporations, it bars imposing liability on natural persons as well.”\textsuperscript{152}

The third major point of the concurring opinion is the distinction between criminal and civil liability in international law. Judge Leval points out that the majority mostly relied on the jurisdictional grants of international criminal tribunals to justify their conclusion that corporate liability is not a cognizable customary norm.\textsuperscript{153} The majority is correct that the international tribunals to which they looked limited their jurisdiction to natural persons.\textsuperscript{154} Yet, the concurrence sees this as a function of the differing purposes between civil and criminal liability and not as a function of the international community’s denial of corporate civil liability for violations of international law.\textsuperscript{155}

This denial of criminal liability does not imply the denial of civil liability upon juridical entities.\textsuperscript{156} Unlike the purposes of criminal liability, the purposes of civil liability can be effectuated by holding corporations financially responsible for their torts.\textsuperscript{157} Civil liability’s “principal objective” is to compensate victims and restore them to their previous condition before the

\textsuperscript{150} Id. at 160 n.11; see also H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 126, at 266 (Archon Books 1970) (1927) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW] (“International jurisprudence is rough when there is no forum . . . before which to fight out its problems.”).

\textsuperscript{151} Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 163 (Leval, J., concurring). This argument is reminiscent of the views of Judge Reinhardt in Unocal and Judge Hall in Khulumani that the controlling law for violations of the law of nations is the common law. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{152} Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 166 (Leval, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{153} Id. at 166 (“The only fact of international law to which the majority can point as evidence of its view that international law does not apply to juridical persons is the fact that international criminal tribunals have not exercised authority to impose criminal punishments on them.”).

\textsuperscript{154} See Rome Statute, supra note 122, art. 25(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 122, art. 5; ICTY Statute, supra note 122, art. 6.

\textsuperscript{155} Id., 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{156} Id. at 168 (“The refusal of international organizations to impose criminal liability of corporations . . . in no way implies that international law deems corporations exempt from international law.”).

\textsuperscript{157} Id. at 169.
tortious damage. Additionally, this can be satisfactorily done only if the liability is on the corporation, instead of the executives, because the corporate entity earned the profit resulting from the illicit activities.

Fourth, Judge Leval, from the outset, looks to the slippery slope to exhibit the potential for abuse the majority holding could yield:

So long as they incorporate (or act in the form of a trust), businesses will now be free to trade in or exploit slaves, employ mercenary armies to do dirty work for despots, perform genocides or operate torture prisons for a despot’s political opponents, or engage in piracy—all without civil liability to victims.

He continues this analysis by providing hypothetical situations in which corporations could perpetrate gross and heinous violations of human rights in the area of slave trading (with an emphasis on sex-slavery), piracy, genocide, and the aiding and abetting of these violations.

Fifth and final, despite the lengthy reasoning of the concurring opinion mostly discussing its divergence from the views of the majority, Judge Leval agrees that the claims in this case should be dismissed. In doing so, he combined the purposeful standard for aiding and abetting liability as stated in Talisman—and also by Judge Katzmann in Khulumani—with the modern pleading standard handed down in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. He then reviewed the sufficiency of the pleadings for both SPDC and RDPC’s direct violations of human rights and its complicity in those violations under the aiding and abetting standard.

It is important to note the complete lack of mention in the concurring opinion of “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”

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158 Id.
159 Id. Judge Leval notes in the same paragraph, “[I]t is the worldwide practice to impose civil liability on corporations.” Id. Yet, nowhere in the concurring opinion are general principles as stated in the ICJ Statute discussed.
160 Id. at 150.
161 Id. at 155–60. The majority dismisses these “hypothetical cases,” by merely reiterating their contention that although corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS, those individual perpetrators responsible for the corporate violation can. Id. at 147–48 (majority opinion).
162 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009).
165 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 188–96 (Leval, J., concurring).
166 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c).
Whereas the majority simply dismisses them as a subsidiary source of international law and turns only to custom to resolve the issues in this case, the concurrence ignores them altogether and relies on domestic law principles to rebut the majority holding that the ATS provides no subject matter jurisdiction over corporate defendants. This Comment proceeds by defining and discussing this recognized source of international law.

III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The present version of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute recognizes “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of international law along with custom, convention, and the works of scholars. This clause has its origin in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ Statute”), Article 38(3). It was first proposed by Baron Descamps, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Jurists. Draft schemes from various countries phrased the intended source slightly differently: “general principles of law” (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), “general principles of law and equity” (Germany and Brazil’s Clovis Bevilaqua), “general principles of justice and equity” (Switzerland), and “rules which, in the considered opinion of the Court, should be the rules of international law” (alternative draft for Norway, Denmark, and Sweden and the draft scheme of the Five Neutral Powers). The eventually adopted text was proposed by Elihu Root, a U.S. statesman, although it is more commonly attributed to his collaborator, Lord Phillimore.

Regardless of the exact phrasing, the inclusion of “general principles of law” was nothing new to the countries drafting the statute. The phrase was a common one and codified in many municipal law systems. This rejection—inherent in the omission of international general principles from the statute—of

167 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43.
168 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1).
170 Cheng, supra note 169, at 7.
171 Id. at 7 & nn.24–27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172 Id. at 14–15.
173 Id. at 19. The nations of three of the ten members who drafted the PCIJ Statute contained the “general principles of law” in their municipal laws. Id.
traditional international law sources recognized that the international legal system is significantly less developed than most municipal legal systems; thus, there will be lacunae where custom and treaty have not developed.\textsuperscript{174} The insertion of general principles in the PCIJ Statute “was intended to provide a solution in cases where treaties and custom provided no (clear) answers to the case at hand.”\textsuperscript{175} By doing so, the ICJ could prevent a plea of \textit{non liquet}—dismissal on the basis of no controlling law.\textsuperscript{176} Moreover, general principles will continue to serve important functions in less developed areas of international law—such as human rights—to resolve issues “which neither conventional nor customary law is ready to meet.”\textsuperscript{177}

Yet, what exactly are “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”?\textsuperscript{178} Scholars have provided varying definitions such as “a core of legal ideas which are common to all civilized legal systems”;\textsuperscript{179} “principles which are so fundamental to every well-ordered society that no reasonable form of co-existence is possible without their being generally recognized as valid”;\textsuperscript{180} and “norms underlying national legal orders . . . the manifestation of the \textit{universal legal conscience} certified by the law of civilized States.”\textsuperscript{181} The consensus that emerges from these definitions is a recognition of “the existence of a common core of objectively identifiable legal principles.”\textsuperscript{182} Some typical general principles that have been recognized in international tribunals are those such as estoppel,\textsuperscript{183} unjust enrichment,\textsuperscript{184} necessity,\textsuperscript{185} and proximate cause.\textsuperscript{186}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{174} See \textit{Bederman}, supra note 15, at 14.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Erika de Wet, \textit{Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the International Court of Justice}, 47 \textit{NETH. INT’L L. REV.} 181, 185–86 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{176} H.C. Gutteridge, \textit{The Meaning and Scope of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice}, 38 \textit{TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y} 125, 125 (1952).
\item \textsuperscript{178} ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c).
\item \textsuperscript{180} J. J.H. W. Verzijl, \textit{International Law in Historical Perspective}, 59 (1968).
\item \textsuperscript{182} Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 771.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
\item \textsuperscript{186} Administrative Decision No. II (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 23, 29 (U.S.–Ger. Mixed Cl. Comm’n 1939).
\end{itemize}
These principles can be derived from both national and international sources.187

Before proceeding to examine examples and applications of general principles as seen in international tribunals, there is another area of ambiguity that should be addressed, namely, the difference between custom and general principles. Neither is a superior source to the other according to both the plain text of the ICJ Statute and the drafting history.188 The line of demarcation between the two is unclear because both include “all that is unwritten in international law.”189

A rule of customary international law is shown by proving that (1) the rule has been followed as a “general practice” and (2) opinio juris.190 The first is exhibited by actual practices of states inter se and is an objective inquiry, while the second, opinio juris, is a subjective element and looks to why international actors act according to the proposed custom.191 This second element is satisfied by showing that states act according to the custom out of a “sense of legal obligation or necessity.”192

In contrast, showing a general principle requires “recognition,” but has no requirement of practice.193 This requirement of recognition makes the search for and eventual use of a general principle more objective.194 Moreover, general principles express a general truth that should guide action and be a

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187 Regardless of their source, the underlying theoretical basis of the use of general principles raises issues of natural law versus positivism. Although a thorough investigation of the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the use of general principles is outside the scope of this discussion, Professor Bassiouni provides a short summary:

[T]here is reason to believe that the framers of the PCIJ’s article 38 (1)(3) and the ICJ’s article 38 (1)(c) may have accepted the notion that natural law may be separate from the naturalists’ understanding of that term, and that it may arise from concrete applications and common practices existing in and among “civilized nations.” Such a composite conception may be viewed as a compromise between positivism and naturalism, if that is at all possible.

Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 774 (footnote omitted).

188 CHENG, supra note 169, at 20 (“[D]uring the discussion in the Committees of the First Assembly, the words ‘in the order following’ (‘en ordre successif’) in the introductory phrase of the draft article were deleted.”).

189 Id. at 23.

190 BEDEMAN, supra note 15, at 16.

191 Id. at 16–17.

192 Id. at 17.

193 CHENG, supra note 169, at 24.

194 De Wet, supra note 175, at 186. This objectivity emerges from the omission of an opinio juris-type element that looks to the subjective reasons why states adhere to a custom.
“theoretical basis” for solutions, while the rules of custom are practical and binding. Additionally, as previously mentioned, custom is limited in its sources to international law and the practices of states among each other, while general principles can be derived from domestic and international law. The subtlety of these differences is a function of international tribunals’ failure to clearly demarcate the two sources and reluctance to decide cases on the basis of general principles.

An advocate attempting to use or rely upon general principles has a difficult task. Both the PCIJ and ICJ have failed to explain the method by which a general principle will be recognized by the court. Adding to the lack of a methodology, the use of general principles suffers from a “paradox” relating to the generality of the principle. Because the principle will be evidenced by widespread recognition in the international community’s various legal systems, the more abstract the principle is, the easier its mass recognition is to prove. Yet, the more abstract the principle, the less useful it is in solving legal disputes in international tribunals. Nevertheless, Professor Lauterpacht has recognized that “international tribunals apply [municipal] law whenever they deem it advisable; that States which are parties before an international tribunal have, as a rule, recourse to analogies of private law,” at least in the context of international arbitral tribunals.

Despite these barriers, some guidelines have been espoused by the courts and can be found in the writings of academics. In AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities (“AM & S Case”), the European Court of Justice looked to general principles of the European Community to

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195 CHENG, supra note 169, at 24 (quoting and translating Gentini Case (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 551, 556 (It.–Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm’n 1903)).
196 Bassioumi, supra note 177, at 791; see also Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 43 (Apr. 12); HERSCHEL LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT § 51, at 166 (1958) (hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT) (“Experience has shown that the main function of ‘general principles of law’ has been that of a safety-valve to be kept in reserve rather than a source of law of frequent application.”). In this case, the ICJ specifically refused to determine whether the issue could be resolved by general principles, but instead relied on a practice and local custom. Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 1960 I.C.J. at 43.
197 Bassioumi, supra note 177, at 796.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 150, § 126, at 267.
decipher a rule on legal confidentiality.\textsuperscript{203} The court surveyed the Member States’ municipal law and presented each state’s view on the confidentiality of documents between counsel and client.\textsuperscript{204} The court sought to derive a general principle of European Community law to cover these communications.\textsuperscript{205} Although finding that this privilege was not identically stated in all the Member States, it was sufficient that some states recognize the confidentiality “inasmuch as it contributes toward the maintenance of the rule of law” while others recognize that “the rights of the defence must be respected.”\textsuperscript{206} This principle arises from “the purpose[] and in the interest[] of the client’s rights of defence.”\textsuperscript{207}

In the \textit{Delagoa Railway Arbitration}, the tribunal based an award from Portugal to the United States and Great Britain resulting from the Portuguese government’s seizure of a railroad on “the general principles of the common law of modern nations.”\textsuperscript{208} Doing so, the tribunal upheld the general principles of compensation for \textit{damnum emergens} (“material damage”) and \textit{lucrum cessans} (“loss of profit”).\textsuperscript{209} In the \textit{Cayuga Indians Claims Case},\textsuperscript{210} the international arbitral tribunal looked to “considerations of justice, equity, and right dealing” and adopted a corporate veil-piercing analogy to hold that the Cayuga Indians were entitled to annuity shares under the Treaty of Ghent of 1814, inter alia.\textsuperscript{211}

Yet, when investigating whether the international community of nations recognizes a general principle, instead of merely European Community parties as in the \textit{AM & S Case}, the ease of identifying a unique principle is more difficult. Three primary issues arise. First is the question of how many nations must accept or evidence the general principle for it to be recognized. The ICJ has rejected the notion of universal acceptance—the idea that it must be evidenced by all nations.\textsuperscript{212} Thus, the principle should be evidenced by a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{203} \textit{Id.} at 1610–13.
\item \textsuperscript{204} \textit{Id.} at 1605–06.
\item \textsuperscript{205} See \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{206} \textit{Id.} at 1610–11.
\item \textsuperscript{207} \textit{Id.} at 1611.
\item \textsuperscript{208} \textit{Lauterpacht, Private Law, supra} note 150, § 128, at 271 (internal quotation mark omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{209} \textit{Id.} § 128, at 270–73.
\item \textsuperscript{210} \textit{Great Britain ex rel. Cayuga Indians v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A.} 173 (Am.–British Cl. Arb. Trib. 1926).
\item \textsuperscript{211} \textit{Id.} at 180, 189.
\item \textsuperscript{212} \textit{Biederman, supra} note 15, at 18.
\end{itemize}
“representative majority” of nations, which includes the “principal” legal systems of the world.213

Second is the question of how uniform the recognition of a general principle must be for its utilization. In the *AM & S Case*, the Advocate General argued that the principle does not have to be identically expressed or followed in the European Community countries to be a recognized principle.214 Still, an advocate must remember the paradox discussed earlier: the more countries, the greater recognition, but also the less specific and useful the principle becomes. A good example is the *Gentini Case*215 in which the Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission unquestionably recognized a principle of prescription—statutes of limitations and repose—although it did not exactly set a numerical standard.216

The third question arising in an investigation to prove a general principle arises from which countries must recognize the principle. The ICJ Statute says that the general principles are those recognized by “civilized” nations.217 The idea of “civilized” nations has been criticized and generally rejected as a legitimate limitation on the use of general principles.218 Instead, the reference to civilized nations refers to the major legal systems of the world, including the common law tradition, civil law tradition, significant religious legal systems, and other ideological legal systems (including socialist law).219

It is this general outline of the world’s significant legal systems that guides the following discussion of corporate tort liability before returning to *Kiobel* and applying the general principle to those facts. Generally, the discussion looks to the laws of nations to prove that corporate tort liability is an established and recognized principle in the major legal systems of the world. Underlying this concept is the general principle of responsibility. In *Factory at Chorzów*, the PCIJ stated that “it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an

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213 De Wet, *supra* note 175, at 187.
216 *Id.* at 556.
obligation to make reparation.” This principle was also evidenced in a Central American Court of Justice decision that provided “the complete analogy between public and private law” when turning to a principle of international responsibility on the basis of the private law conception of fault. Thus, while looking to the text of municipal law systems to discover a general principle of corporate tort liability, underlying most of the rationales will be the general principle of responsibility.

IV. IMPOSITION OF CORPORATE TORT LIABILITY

A. Civil Versus Criminal

Before examining the world’s legal systems for principles of corporate civil tort liability, an initial decision between civil and criminal liability must be justified. This is not a trivial distinction. The majority’s reliance on international—and primarily customary—criminal law in *Kiobel* was a major dividing point between the majority and the stinging concurrence.

The doctrine of corporate criminal liability was an accepted idea before the French Revolution when its acceptance declined with the rise of the ideal of individualism. The growing industrialization of the world’s economies began to see courts struggling against the conceptual barriers against corporate criminal liability. These arguments were similar in both the United States and the United Kingdom and had three general points of contention. First, because a corporation is a legal fiction, it is limited to actions for which it is legally empowered—also known as the *ultra vires* rule. Second, corporations were not contemplated to be able to have the requisite mens rea for perpetration of criminal acts. Third, sanctioning difficulties arose: corporations cannot be

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220 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13); see also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (finding that Albania was “responsible” for injury and had “a duty . . . to pay compensation”). For an excellent discussion of the general principle of responsibility, see *Cheng*, supra note 169, 163–70.

221 *Lauperacht*, Private Law, supra note 150, § 135, at 287 (quoting *Editorial, 3 AM. J. INT’L L.* 423, 436 (1909)).


224 *Id.* at 495.

225 *Id.*
imprisoned or—as was the typical punishment for felonies in English courts—executed or deported.226

Today, the *ultra vires* rule has eroded in the United States and the United Kingdom.227 Three cases in the United Kingdom and a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case have also overcome the hesitation of courts to impute mens rea to the corporation through doctrines of vicarious liability.228 Canada overcame this argument with strict and absolute liability regimes.229 The sanctioning difficulties were resolved by the imposition of fines and other sanctions such as loss of license, probation, or debarment—the loss of government contracts.230 The French Penal Code allows for corporations to be fined up to five times the maximum for individuals, while the Dutch Penal Code provides that any criminal sanction applicable to an individual can be applied to a corporation, except for those which cannot be (e.g., imprisonment).231

The currently problematic issue arising from international prosecution of legal entities such as corporations is that no international tribunal has the jurisdiction to adjudicate legal entities; their jurisdiction only extends to natural persons.232 Although there is no “theoretical obstacle” to holding corporations liable for violations of international law,233 negotiations to include legal entities as subjects of adjudication for the International Criminal Court failed in the formation of the Rome Statute.234 Thus, this form of liability is generally available only in national legal systems.

Comparatively, the use of civil remedies provides two primary advantages over the criminal system. First, the claims can be initiated by the victims against which the crimes were perpetrated or their survivors.235 The advantage

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226 Id.
229 Stessens, supra note 223, at 497.
231 Stessens, supra note 223, at 516; see also *Code Pénal* [C. péna.] art. 131-41 (Fr.); *Wetboek van Strafrecht* [SR] [Criminal Code] art. 51 (Neth.).
233 Id.
235 See Civil Remedies, supra note 22, at 4.
here bypasses the need to involve possibly reluctant municipal authorities to initiate the suit. Second, following from this and the general principle of responsibility, the victims of human rights abuses can be paid damages directly. Moreover, and particularly relevant here, civil tort liability to compensate victims for damages is a longstanding principle in most nations, while corporate criminal liability is still developing. Because of this long tradition of domestic corporate liability and its worldwide acceptance, it was erroneous for the Second Circuit to use vacuums in international criminal law to justify their rejection of the civil litigation mechanism and the principle revealed by an investigation into the general principles of law seen around the world.

B. Common Law Jurisdictions

The common law jurisdictions handle issues of civil liability through the law of torts. Tort law allows compensation to subjects of injury for protected "interests" such as life, liberty, and property. According to William L. Prosser, tort law serves five primary functions:

1. to provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might otherwise “take the law into their own hands”; 2. to deter wrongful conduct; 3. to encourage socially responsible behavior; 4. to restore injured parties to their original condition . . . by compensating them for their injury; and 5. to vindicate individual rights of redress.

Without even looking to the domestic law of tort in the common law countries, holding corporations accountable for their torts furthers all five of these goals, specifically in the context of the Kiobel facts, by deterring vigilantism against the corporate entity while simultaneously deterring the use of illegitimate means to quell protesting parties and instead promoting

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236 See id.
238 CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he law of civil remedies may often provide victims with their only legal avenue to remedy.”). The Rome Statute of the ICC does allow for victims to present views and seek reparations and also allows for fines to be paid into a Trust Fund for victims. See Rome Statute, supra note 122, art. 79. Yet, as previously mentioned, this court was not given jurisdiction over legal entities.
240 Id.
responsible means to solutions to restore those suffering injury to the status quo and vindicating their rights of redress.

The corporation can incur tort liability in two ways: directly and vicariously. Vicarious corporate liability is a form of strict liability regime wherein the principal is absolutely liable for the torts of an agent as if it were the tortious actor itself. Yet, this investigation merely seeks to decipher a general principle that corporations are held civilly liable for their torts. Kiobel’s holding is that international law has not sufficiently defined corporate liability to be a cognizable customary norm such that U.S. courts would have subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS. Thus, regardless of the doctrinal mechanism through which liability is imposed on the corporate entity, the mere fact that liability is imposed is sufficient for this investigation.

In the United Kingdom, the first real mention of vicarious liability in the sense of an employer’s liability for harm caused by the employee while acting in the scope of his employment is Hern v. Nichols in 1709. In this case, an agent fraudulently represented the quality of silk he was selling. The purchaser brought an action for deceit and the court held that the employer should be liable civilly because he put “a trust and confidence” in the deceiving employee. Although deceit can be considered an intentional tort, vicarious liability traditionally did not cover intentional torts under interpretations of the United Kingdom’s controlling Salmond test. This recently changed in the United Kingdom in Lister v. Hesley Hall Limited, which held an employer vicariously liable for torts arising out of the sexual

247 Id. at 289.
248 Id.
250 Lister, 1 A.C. 215.
assault of emotionally and behaviorally problematic boys by the warden of their boarding annex.\footnote{Id. at 230 (opinion of Steyn, L.). It is interesting to note that the court here essentially overruled an earlier case. Lord Steyn wrote that the earlier case was “carefully considered and reasoned,” but that the court’s “allegiance must be to legal principle.” Id. at 223.}

In the Lister opinion, Lord Steyn commented favorably on two recent cases by the Canadian Supreme Court in this area of vicarious liability for intentional torts.\footnote{Id. at 230.} In one of these cases, the Canadian Supreme Court explicitly referenced the use of the Salmond test, as evidence of vicarious liability’s similar growth and application in Canada, borrowing from U.K. common law.\footnote{See Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, 543 (Can.).} In this case, the court held a non-profit organization liable for torts arising from the sexual assault of children by a caretaker at a residential child-care facility.\footnote{Id. at 567–68.} Moreover, both Canada and the United Kingdom have stated that to the extent that violations of international human rights laws give rise to injuries cognizable as torts (such as assault, battery, false imprisonment), civil remedies would be available.\footnote{FAFO, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: CANADA 4–5 (2006), http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/Canada.pdf; STEPHEN POWLES ET AL., FAFO, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: UNITED KINGDOM 22 (2006), http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/UK.pdf.} It seems to follow that if courts are comfortable holding corporations and non-profits liable for sexual abuse injuries inflicted by those under their control, then relief should be available for providing funding for atrociously violent human rights violations.

The idea of vicarious liability for intentional torts is also seen in U.S. jurisprudence. Respondeat superior is not limited to negligence, but also extends to “willful and malicious torts of an employee.”\footnote{Bussard v. Minimed, Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 679–80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 444 (Cal. 1995)).} Moreover, the United States stands at the forefront of civil protection for the rights of plaintiffs injured by breaches of international law because of the ATS itself. Before the holding in Kiobel, it was presumed that corporations could be held liable for these torts under the aiding and abetting theory, making the United States a leader in corporate tort liability.\footnote{See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).}
Finally, in Australia, employers are vicariously liable for intentional torts committed in the course of employment.\footnote{258 See New South Wales v. Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 547 (H.C.) (Austl.) (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.).} Again, citations to and use of the Salmond test appear in the High Court of Australia’s opinion in New South Wales v. Lapore.\footnote{259 Id. at 511.} In this case, Judge Kirby wrote that the fact that the torts were intentional was not a bar to vicarious liability and cited with approval the Canadian and English cases discussed above.\footnote{260 Id. at 603–04, 623.}

Thus, as can be seen from the above analysis of major common law systems, the concept of liability for the corporate employer is not foreign in the less egregious realm of negligence or in the field of intentional torts. Therefore, the common law clearly recognizes a principle of law that holds corporations liable for tortious conduct committed in furtherance of their interests.

C. Civil Law Jurisdictions

The civil law tradition traces its existence from ancient Rome and is the most prominent legal system in the world.\footnote{261 JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 3 (1995), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/civillaw.pdf/$file/civillaw.pdf.} Although controlled by a large body of statutory law, a de facto system of precedent deriving from interpretations of the statutes has begun to develop and has become especially important in the French law of delicts whose treatment in the Code Civil is quite general.\footnote{262 Id. at 31.} As well as the developing reliance on judicial rulings between the civil and common law systems, similarities in vicarious liability exist. The solutions given by the civil law jurisdictions and the common law jurisdictions are similar.\footnote{263 Kwame Opoku, Delictual Liability in German Law, 21 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 230, 230 (1972).}

Looking at many civil codes, their general treatment of corporations and liability for torts follow similar patterns: early provisions give the corporation some sense of legal personality such that it is given rights and incurs obligations, and later provisions provide for principles of reparation for tortious harm committed by those with legal personality.\footnote{264 See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, §§ 21–22, 823, 831 (Ger.). Although this pattern is not uniform, it is the general treatment pertinent to this discussion.}
The French civil code, which Napoleon considered his greatest achievement and has influenced countless other civil codes worldwide, has a quite broad treatment of torts. Article 1382 states that any act that causes damage to the other creates an obligation to compensate the victim by the person at fault. Article 1384 codifies vicarious liability by stating that a person is also liable for damages caused by those for whom he is responsible. The French civil system is highly influential and has been adopted, either in part or in whole, in many countries including Belgium, the Netherlands, and Egypt.

The German civil code has also been highly influential amongst the world’s civil law systems. Sections 21 and 22 provide for the legal personality of associations. Section 823 imposes liability for intentional or negligent injury of life, body, health, freedom, property, or another right. The liability for vicarious agents is outlined in Section 831 for those “who use another person to perform a task” when that person unlawfully inflicts damage while “carrying out the task.” The principal can be exculpated from this liability if reasonable care was taken in selecting the agent causing the tortious injury.

Japan’s civil code is more straightforward in its treatment of the liability for legal persons. Article 44 provides that a juridical person will be liable for damage to others caused either by its directors or other agents while performing their duties for the corporation.

The civil code in Russia is written with extraordinary clarity. Like the German code, Articles 48 and 49 provide for the concept and legal capacity of the legal entity, which the Russian code defines as an organization that has its own “set-apart property and . . . is answerable by its obligations with this

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265  APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 14 n.5.
266  CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.).
267  Id. art. 1384.
269  APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 1.
270  BÜRGERSCHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, §§ 21–22 (Ger.).
271  Id. § 823, para. 1.
273  Id.
274  MINPÔ [MINPO] [CIV. C.] art. 44, para. 1 (Japan).
property.” Article 1068 provides that a “legal entity... shall redress the injury inflicted by the employee” as well as for the liability of “[e]conomic partnerships and procedure cooperatives” when injury is inflicted by its “participants (members).”

In Norway, business entities domestically domiciled can have both civil and criminal actions brought against it for actions committed within and outside of the country. Compensation is available for “personal bodily injury, loss of future income and for the assumed future expenses that will be debited to the harmed person,” and if the victim is harmed in a “lastingly and considerable way,” they are entitled to compensation for that injury.

The Spanish civil law was responsible for the spread of civil law in Central and South America. Article 35 of the Código Civil classifies corporations as juridical persons whose personality begins from the moment they are validly constituted and states that associations of private interest are granted individual personality independent from that of each of its members. Article 1902 generally imposes liability for tortious injury while Article 1903 states that this recompense for damage is demandable from those of persons for whom others must respond, announcing a general vicarious liability principle.

The Chilean civil code is significant because it greatly influenced many other Latin American legal systems and was either adopted entirely or used as a model in Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Article 54 states that people can be either legal or natural persons. Article 552 imputes the acts of agents as those of the corporation and Article 2314 states that people committing torts are liable to compensate

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278 Id. at 20.
279 APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 16.
280 CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (Spain).
281 Id. art. 35.
282 Id. arts. 1902–03.
283 APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 17.
284 CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] art. 54 (Chile).
the victim. Thus, reading Articles 552 and 2314 *in pari materia*, vicarious liability is established.

The Brazilian civil code has been called the “greatest monument to legal thought and codification in Latin America.” Article 45 gives corporations legal existence and personality when they register. Article 932 provides the liability for employers for torts committed by agents and employees.

Although this is by no means a complete treatment of every national civil legal system, it stands as a proper representation of the treatment of corporations in the civil law tradition. To provide a final justification for the general principle, the European Group on Tort Law (“European Group”) sheds some light in its 2005 publication of the Principles of European Tort Law. Article 4:202 of these principles provides for what the European Group calls enterprise liability. This article imposes liability on those using “auxiliaries” (the European Group’s term for agents or employees) for the harm caused by those auxiliaries. Moreover, Article 6:102 expressly provides for liability when damage is caused by an auxiliary acting “within the scope of their functions.” Thus, as the European Group and the previous investigation of national civil codes reveals, the civil law tradition embraces the general principles of tort liability for corporations by giving them legal personality and holding them liable through the vehicle of vicarious liability.

D. Theological Legal Systems

1. Jewish Law

Jewish law, or *Halakha*, is sparse on its treatment of legal entities and corporations. Multiple perspectives for analyzing the modern corporate

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285 *Id.* arts. 552, 2314.
286 *APPLE & DEYLING*, supra note 261, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
287 *CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.]* art. 45 (Braz.).
288 *Id.* art. 932.
291 *Id.*
292 *Id.* art. 6:102.
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entity have been developed by Jewish law scholars. The perspective most similar to the secular concept of corporations is called the Halakhic entity approach. Under this perspective, Jewish law recognizes the corporations as the owner of corporate assets, and thus a separate entity from the shareholders just as secular law does.

In the area of tort law, Halakha generally does not recognize the principle of vicarious liability. Yet, two important points mitigate the potential evisceration of a general principle that would hold corporations liable for their torts. First, in an investigation to discover a general principle, it does not have to be recognized by all nations “so long as there is evidence that is applied by a representative majority which includes the principal legal systems of the world.” Thus, the absence of this norm in Halakhic tradition does not immediately deprive the world of a general principle of corporate tort liability. Second, Jewish law recognizes the doctrine of dina de’malkhuta dina, or “the law of the land is the law.” Thus, in the nations of the world that would hold a corporation liable, such as the common law or civil law traditions, Jewish law would allow this imposition, although not provided for in Halakha.

2. Islamic Law

Islamic, or Sharia, law designates rules and regulations governing the lives of the practitioners of Islam. Its influence spread far beyond its birthplace in the Arabian peninsula and Lower Mesopotamia. As the Arab empire spread, Sharia law spread to Spain and Central Asia. Before the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the only country with a completely Islamic legal system was Saudi Arabia. After 1979, Iran and Sudan replaced “Western style laws with an Islamic legal system” and, to a lesser degree, Libya and Pakistan as well.

294 Id. at 1695–97.
295 Id. at 1738.
296 Id. at 1738–39.
297 Id. at 1779.
298 De Wet, supra note 175, at 187.
299 Broyde & Resnicoff, supra note 293, at 1696.
302 Id.
304 Id.
Sharia law has primary sources in the Quran and Sunnah and also recognizes secondary sources in “the interpretations and opinions of the learned jurists.”

In the commercial sphere, the goal of the law of Islam is not to inhibit fair trade and commerce, but “to allow people to earn their living in a fair and profitable way without exploitation of others.” Sharia originally did not recognize the existence of the juridical entity that is a corporation, and the concept that a partnership would exist as an entity separate from its partners developed only recently as a function of Western influence. Although assuming a type of legal “capability,” or dhimma, this capability does not endow Islamic corporations with a liability shield as seen in the West. Moreover, Sharia expounds the rule of strict liability as the “bedrock” of judicial actions under Islamic tort law such that only the tortfeasor is liable for a particular tort action.

Today, the idea of juristic personality has been recognized by most of the Islamic countries in the Middle East, including those who base regulation on Sharia rather than Western law, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar. Yet, in the field of vicarious tort liability, the scholars seem to be divided. Some suggest that respondeat superior has no place in Islamic law according to the principle of strict liability for responsible tortfeasors. Others use the term fiqh “al-‘āqilah” to apply to those people (“employers”) who can bear the responsibility of diyah (“blood-money”) on the employee’s behalf.

This latter concept of fiqh “al-‘āqilah” is similar to that seen in many common and civil law traditions, which impute the act of the employee “as if the employer caused the loss or damage himself.” Thus, there is no theoretical obstacle to the imposition of tort liability on a corporate entity in Islamic law. Yet, this conclusion may not have fully solidified. The concept of

305 Id. at 26.
306 Id. at 160.
308 Id. at 180–81.
312 Bin Mohammad, Employer, supra note 309, at 198.
313 Id. at 202.
a juridical entity was not in the writings of classical Islamic scholars and is developing as a result of Western influence. Moreover, the idea of vicarious liability may have been previously rejected, but is now receiving scholarship and validity from Islamic theorists. Thus, although the precise recognition of corporate tort liability is unclear in Islam, it appears there are no significant barriers to its development.

Of the systems and national legal structures analyzed, agency and vicarious liability are common themes. Returning to the United States, in the modern era of corporate tort liability under the ATS, the theory of aiding and abetting or complicity in human rights abuses was the primary cause of action against corporations. Yet, this concept is unnecessary and its controversy moot if corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. Yet, as this discussion concludes, corporate civil liability is a general principle of international law, and this doctrine, as applied to Kiobel, should not prevent the imposition of aiding and abetting liability for international law violations—assuming that aiding and abetting liability is a sufficiently specified or recognized norm of the law of nations.

V. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO KIOBEL

In this Part, this Comment first looks to the panel majority’s treatment of general principles and its misplaced reliance on the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Next, it looks to the concurring opinion to show that, although Judge Leval followed a method similar to that

314 Zahraa, supra note 310, at 202.

315 Saleh, supra note 307, at 180.


317 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path 8–16 (2008) (describing different methods in which a corporation may be held liable).


319 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254; Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
of application of general principles, he nevertheless ignored this important source. Third, this Comment analyzes the full bench of the Second Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc and deals primarily with Chief Judge Jacobs’s arguments and how they could be remedied by the use of general principles. This Comment then applies the above-determined general principle and suggests how the Supreme Court may have alluded to and endorsed its use. Finally, this Comment will look at the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Kiobel.

A. Majority Opinion Analysis

The majority’s classification of the use of “general principles” as being a matter of domestic law is a mischaracterization for two reasons. First, the majority cites to Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. for the concept that customary international law does not view “universally proscribed” conduct under domestic law as relevant for purposes of determining what customary international law truly is. This is not an inaccurate statement of the law in that general principles are not a consideration in the custom inquiry. Yet, this phrasing in Flores confuses and conflates two separate sources of international law. Whereas custom looks to the norms and mores to which states have abided in their relations inter se, the formulation “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” is an implicit rejection of the necessity to look to the relations among the states. If general principles were to somehow be derived from the actions of states in their interactions with each other, then it stands to reason that the general principles, as outlined in the ICJ Statute, would have referred to international law, as the statute expressly did when it established international custom as a source. Thus, although the court in Flores was correct in saying that the investigation into custom does not consider general principles relevant, this does not support the idea that general principles cannot act as their own source in providing independent rules of decision and scope of liability determinations. Adding to this, a
hierarchy between custom, treaty, and general principles was explicitly rejected in the drafting of Article 38.326

Second, the Second Circuit also relied upon the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,327 which actually undermines their ultimate conclusion on the value of general principles to international law. Section 102(4) of the Restatement states: “General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of international law as appropriate.”328 Even the comment to which the majority cited and on which it relied in rejecting general principles admits that they can be “resorted to for developing international law interstitially in special circumstances.”329

Thus, it is appropriate to argue that corporate liability for international law violations is a special circumstance warranting the invocation of those general principles that the world’s major legal systems have recognized. To this point, comment (l) to § 102 of the Restatement lists specific rules that have been drawn from Article 38(c) of the ICJ Statute, namely, “rules relating to the administration of justice, such as the rule that no one may be judge in his own cause; res judicata; and rules of fair procedure generally.”330 It is logical that these would not be evidenced by customary international law. Disallowing a person “to be judge in his own cause” is not a principle of the type that would ordinarily be embodied in the sources of custom as evidenced by the practice of states inter se. It is one that follows from the basic concepts of law and its practical operation. These examples evidence the function of general principles as filling gaps or lacunae in international law.331

Moreover, the same comment goes on to say that general principles can also provide “rules of reason’ of a general character, such as acquiescence and estoppel, the principle that rights must not be abused, and the obligation to repair a wrong.”332 The Restatement’s inclusion of principles such as that

326 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 782.
327 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43.
329 Id. § 102, cmt. (l), at 28.
330 Id. § 102, cmt. (l), at 29.
332 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102, cmt. (l), at 29 (emphasis added).
“rights must not be abused” and an “obligation to repair a wrong”\footnote{Id.} is a direct parallel with the one of the purposes of tort liability—“to restore injured parties to their original condition . . . by compensating them for their injury; and . . . to vindicate individual rights of redress.”\footnote{SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 241, at 1–2.} Thus, the Restatement seems to provide an argument for the use of general principles to derive corporate liability under the ATS, undermining the majority’s reliance on one sentence in the comment to Section 102.

B. Concurring Opinion Analysis

The key fault with the concurring opinion is its position on the role and power of domestic law in holding corporations liable for civil damages. Judge Leval repeatedly maintained a position evidenced by the argument that “[t]he position of international law on whether civil liability should be imposed for violations of its norms is that international law takes no position and leaves that question to each nation to resolve.”\footnote{Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).} First, it stands to note that he provided no citation or support for this proposition. He merely moved from a lacuna in the scope of international law to the application of domestic law. In doing so, he skipped right over the very concept that would resolve his conflict and put him more in line with the correct statement of international law, namely the application of general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.

The position for which Judge Leval advocated is not dissimilar to the application of general principles. He used a concept that is well known in U.S. law to fill the gap in international law concerning the liability of corporations for their torts committed against aliens. This does not significantly differ from taking the general principle seen in the world’s major legal systems, including the United States, and applying it here to uphold corporate liability. The use of general principles recognizes the authority of the ICJ Statute and looks to municipal law to determine what the law is on the issue. Although his assertion is correct that generally international law is indifferent as to the enforcement of its rules, Judge Leval applied only the domestic principles of the United States, which “draws no distinction in its laws between violators who are natural persons and corporations.”\footnote{Id.}
C. Denial of Rehearing

In February 2011, the Second Circuit denied rehearing in *Kiobel*.

Three separate opinions were filed: a dissent from Judge Leval and concurring opinions from Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Cabranes (the author of the *Kiobel* panel majority opinion). Whereas Judge Cabranes filed just a paragraph, mostly supporting the *Kiobel* panel reasoning and rejecting claims that it was motivated by a policy agenda, Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Leval filed heated opinions, directly addressing each other’s arguments. Because the views posited in these arguments have erroneous propositions and this case presents an opportunity to use general principles, this Comment analyzes the denial opinions, primarily Jacobs’s concurrence.

Unlike the opinion of the *Kiobel* panel, Chief Judge Jacobs’s concurring opinion to the denial of a rehearing is full of foreign policy considerations. Generally, he posited that because “foreign companies are creatures of other states” and are “often engines of their national economies,” then American courts are overreaching in ATS litigation by exerting the “power to bring to court transnational corporations of other counties . . . and to beggar them by rendering their assets into compensatory damages, punitive damages, and (American) legal fees,” thus undermining comity. He then referred to statements made by South African President Thabo Mbeki characterizing the *Khulumani* decision as “judicial imperialism.” He closed his policy considerations by arguing that there is no danger of other states protecting their corporations from judicial action in their home state because “no one would protect any enemy of all mankind.”

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337 *Kiobel* v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011). A request for a rehearing en banc was also denied on the same day. *Kiobel* v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011).

338 *Kiobel*, 642 F.3d at 268.

339 *Id.* at 272 (Cabranes, J., concurring).

340 *Id.* at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring). Judge Leval stingingly dismisses most of Jacobs’s policy arguments:

I do not contend by any means that all of Judge Jacobs’s policy concerns are frivolous. If it were the proper role of a panel of the U.S. courts to make and implement the foreign policy of the United States, some of his concerns would call for serious attention and evaluation.

341 *Id.* at 273 (Leval, J., dissenting).

342 *Id.* at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).

343 *Id.*
Chief Judge Jacobs’s policy concerns are misguided and, even those that are not, can be remedied by means significantly less severe than the result in Kiobel provides. Kiobel’s bright-line prohibition on actions against corporations under the ATS itself is “seizing the initiative to make foreign and domestic policy” by restricting access to U.S. courts under an erroneous use of international law, namely the rejection of general principles. Moreover, many of his concerns about “judicial imperialism” are applicable to ATS actions against natural persons as well as corporations. Yet, he does not call for the repeal of the ATS to thwart this concern.

Especially striking is Chief Judge Jacobs’s naïveté in suggesting that foreign states have no interest in protecting corporations that are perpetrating international law violations. This is striking because of Jacobs’s recognition that actions may be against corporations that are the “engines of their national economies.” If the engine of a state’s economy is in danger because of suits arising from its complicity in human rights violations, that state has a substantial interest in not bringing them to justice. This is one of the main advantages of the ATS’s use of the civil suit mechanism: the victims (or their survivors) can bring the claims themselves in the face of a potentially reluctant state prosecutor. Also not mentioned by Jacobs is an alternative to the bright-line prohibition found in the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which could easily deal with issues of American versus foreign adjudication.

Chief Judge Jacobs also argued contradictorily by stating both that Kiobel is “of no big consequence” and also that Kiobel “matters.” He stated first that it is unimportant because the court’s earlier holding in Talisman—wherein the court adopted the purposive standard for aiding and abetting liability—has foreclosed ATS suits against corporations to the “vanishing point.” On the other hand, he argued that Kiobel is important because, without it, “plaintiffs would be able to plead around Talisman in a way that (notwithstanding Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal) would delay dismissal.” Both of these contentions are vulnerable to criticism.

344 Id. at 273 (Leval, J., dissenting).
345 See id. at 276.
346 Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
347 Id.
348 Id. at 271.
349 Id.
350 Id. (citations omitted).
Judge Leval rightly pointed out the “strange logic” of Jacobs’s use of *Talisman.*[^351] If *Talisman*’s standard will dismiss all but the most heinous and factually supported ATS claims, then *Kiobel*’s only role is to exonerate all but the most heinous and factually supported ATS claims.[^352] Responding to the contrary argument for *Kiobel*’s importance, his terse dismissal of the pleading barrier provided by *Iqbal* is inapproriate. Undoubtedly, *Iqbal* made the motion to dismiss stage more difficult for plaintiffs to surpass by requiring a plausible claim for relief and even more so in litigation whose evidence and facts span multiple nations.[^353] Chief Judge Jacobs’s terse dismissal of the weight and difficulty in pleading provided by *Iqbal* and *Twombly* does not give enough credit to this initial barrier.

Chief Judge Jacobs also raised another issue that could be easily solved by the use and application of general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. He wrote: “The imposition of liability on corporations, moreover, raises vexed questions. What employee actions can be imputed to the corporation? What about piercing the corporate veil? . . . Punitive damages is a peculiar feature of American law; can they be exacted?”[^354] Questions such as these beg for the use of general principles because they are unlikely to be evidenced by custom. General principles fill the lacunae of international law where the domestic legal systems of the world have already come to a consensus. Questions about scope of actions, veil piercing, and punitive damages awards could be easily solved by looking to the legal systems of the world as evidence of an accepted treatment.

### D. Certiorari Granted

On October 17, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in *Kiobel.*[^355] Because of the Second Circuit’s sua sponte decision to consider the corporate liability issue of as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court certified a second question in its grant, namely, “[w]hether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort Statute (‘ATS’), 28 U.S.C.

[^351]: Id. at 276 (Leval, J., dissenting).
[^352]: Id. at 275–76 (“In other words, the defendants who secure exoneration by the operation of the majority’s rule are the ones who acted most heinously, such as slave traders, pirates, and mercenaries who contract to torture and carry out genocides.”).
[^354]: Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
§ 1350, is a merits question . . . or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction."  

This Comment will briefly discuss the significance of this issue.

It is important to consider the consequences of the Court’s decision on this issue. If the question of whether a corporation can be liable under the ATS is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, then the Second Circuit committed no error by raising it sua sponte. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), a court must dismiss an action if it “at any time” determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 357 If, however, the Court finds that the corporate liability issue is a merits question, then it was improper for the Second Circuit to raise the issue and dismiss on that basis.

Most recently, the Court looked at whether the extraterritorial application of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act was an issue of subject matter jurisdiction in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 358 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated, “to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question.” 359 Thus, the Court held that this issue was a merits question. In this case, the Court held that the jurisdictional statute (§ 78aa) supporting the substantive cause of action (§ 10(b)) allowed for jurisdiction. 360

Similarly, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 361 the Court looked at Title VII’s requirements to determine whether the fact that an employer did not meet the statutory definition of an “employer” was an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 362 Yet, like in Morrison, the term “employee” does not appear in the actual jurisdiction-granting provision of Title VII, but in a substantive definitional provision. 363 The Court expressed concern about “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” wherein “[j]udicial opinions . . . often obscure the

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357 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).


359 Id. at 2877.

360 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 10(b), 78aa (Supp. IV 2010).


362 Id. at 504–07.

363 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (“Each United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.”).

364 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
issue by stating that the court is dismissing for lack of jurisdiction when some threshold fact has not been established, without explicitly considering whether the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.”

Considering *Morrison* and *Arbaugh*, *Kiobel* presents a similar situation. In *Kiobel*, the Second Circuit considered whether a corporate defendant could be subject to suit under the ATS’s jurisdictional support. The Second Circuit looked to a jurisdictional statute, but considered a subject and issue not mentioned within the statutory language, namely whether a particular defendant can be sued. In *Morrison*, the Court looked to where someone could be sued and held that it was a merits question. The issue of where someone could be sued was not mentioned in the jurisdiction-granting statute. In *Arbaugh*, the Court considered whether someone fit a substantive definitional provision and held that it was a merits question. The specific term whose definition was not met (“employer”) was not mentioned in the jurisdiction-granting statute. And here, in *Kiobel*, the Court will consider whether a particular entity is within the reach of the jurisdiction-granting statute. And, like in the two cases above, the defendant (or the persons capable of being a defendant) is not mentioned in the jurisdiction-granting statute (the ATS). It seems that *Morrison* and *Arbaugh* are directly applicable and this issue is one of merits, not one of jurisdiction.

Yet, this should not be the kill switch on the Court’s analysis. Even though in *Morrison* the majority found that the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) was a merits question, the Court stated that because none of the lower courts’ analyses relied on the mistake of whether the issue was jurisdictional or went to the merits, a remand on this issue was unnecessary. The Court then continued to consider whether § 10(b) was indeed extraterritorial. Because a “remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule

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365 *Id.* (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
369 *Arbaugh*, 546 U.S. at 516.
372 *Morrison*, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
373 *Id.*
12(b)(1) conclusion, the Court should still consider whether corporations are shielded from ATS liability, regardless of the Court’s conclusion on the subject matter jurisdiction versus merits question.

E. Application of the General Principle

After investigating the world’s legal systems, looking to the *Kiobel* opinions, and recognizing their underlying error by ignoring general principles of law, the application of this general principle that corporations can be held liable for their perpetration and furtherance of tortious injury is simple. The ATS claims against RDPC should be allowed to go forward, at least to a factual inquiry of sufficiency of the pleadings under *Iqbal*. Judge Leval, while vehemently dissenting against the majority reasoning, found these pleadings to be insufficient under this test. The fact that there was sufficient ground to dismiss all of the Nigerian plaintiffs’ claims for insufficient pleadings increases the curiosity of the broad and unexpected majority holding on an unbriefed issue.

Dismissing this case on the jurisdictional ATS issue was against the weight of authority of both the Second Circuit and other courts. Although the majority is correct that unresolved issues “lurk[ing] in the record . . . are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents,” the weight of authority which has either assumed that corporate ATS liability is available or allowed the suit to go forward without deciding is unquestionably persuasive. Moreover, *Kiobel* creates a direct circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit. In light of all this authority, the reasoning behind the majority’s

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374 *Id.*


376 Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925).

377 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 261 n.12 (2d Cir. 2009) (assuming without deciding corporate liability); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (declining to decide the issue because it was not raised by the defendant); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing claims for forced labor, murder, and rape without determining state action); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 105–08 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing claims for aiding and abetting terrorism due to lack of intent); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that plaintiffs stated a “color of law” requirement sufficient to sustain claims under the ATS).

378 See *Romero* v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). Since *Kiobel*’s decision, the circuit split has deepened. See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of
reluctance to utilize general principles to resolve this question in favor of the weight of assumptions, suppositions, and an opposite holding is baffling.

Adding to the force of this conclusion, the use of general principles should meet the strictures of the Supreme Court’s test in *Sosa*. *Sosa*’s requirement that “any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized” allows for the acceptance of a general principle. General principles are “norm[s] of international character” to the extent that they are one of the three principal sources of international law, as outlined in the ICJ Statute. The objective search for recognition and precise definition of the general principle should meet the specificity requirement of the holding as well. Thus, the Supreme Court may have already hinted at and subtly endorsed the solution to the *Kiobel* problem, which the Second Circuit so casually rejected.

CONCLUSION

A. Implications of *Kiobel*

The immediate effect of the Second Circuit’s decision is apparent: corporations will not be held liable for their torts in violation of the law of nations. Shortly after this decision was written, but before filing, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed an ATS suit on the same grounds as *Kiobel*. In this opinion, the district court undertook an extensive review of the justifications for previous impositions of corporate liability including logical extensions and stare decisis arguments. Just like the majority in *Kiobel*, the Central District of California dismissed the use of general principles in a footnote.

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380 Id. at 725; see also ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1).
383 Id. at 1130–33.
384 Id. at 1144 n.70.
Reading that opinion together with the Second Circuit’s *Kiobel* decision, the two are strikingly similar. Yet, neither provides a sufficient basis to refute one of Judge Leval’s arguments in his concurring opinion. Judge Leval argued that the remedy afforded by the ATS is not one that was handed down by international law, but was the judgment of Congress addressing a perceived need for a remedial measure for violations of international law cognizable at the time of its passage. As such, a judgment of Congress is susceptible to judicial interpretation in the face of conflict and ambiguity. Obviously, Congress did not speak to jurisdictional requirements concerning legal entities explicitly or implicitly in the statute. Thus, it is entirely consistent with U.S. juridicial practice to hold corporations liable.

The *Kiobel* majority extols their previous investigations of customary international law as proof that they have engaged in the same analysis to determine the scope of liability under international law. Yet, the majority’s reliance on their decision in *Kadic* is slightly mischaracterized. Although they are correct that they looked to customary international law to determine whether non-state actors could be individually liable for international law violations, they did so exclusively in relation to the particular substantive norm attempting to be established. They did not make a blanket statement that individual actors could or could not be liable for international law violations as a bright-line rule. Thus, it is incorrect to state that their analysis in *Kiobel*—wherein they did wholly deny corporate liability with no relation to any particular substantive norm—follows necessarily from their analysis in *Kadic*.

Moreover, the majority overstates the clarity of the *Kadic* analysis and holding. In that case, they held that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.” By limiting this holding to “certain forms of conduct,” this is a far cry from the establishment of an international norm holding individuals (natural persons) liable for their international law violations under the ATS. Thus, following another of Judge Leval’s arguments,

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385 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 175 (Leval, J., concurring); see also *Sosa*, 504 U.S. at 725.
386 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 128 (“Likewise, in *Kadic v. Karadžić*, . . . international law provided the rules by which the court decided whether certain conduct violated the law of nations when committed by non-state actors.”) (citation omitted).
387 In *Kadic*, the Second Circuit held that some specific violations of international law were cognizable and recognized under the court’s ATS jurisdiction whether committed by states or individuals. See supra Part I.
389 *Id.* at 239.
it seems that this limited holding that is far from clear or bright line cannot stand for the proposition that individual liability for those not acting under the auspices or color of state is a recognized norm of the community of nations. If the majority cannot justify this foundational premise of ATS liability, then it seems inapropos for them to extend it to juridical entities.

The decision also implicates procedural barriers. The Supreme Court rejected the complaint in Ashcroft v. Iqbal for failure to state a “plausible” claim for relief against the Attorney General for discrimination infringing on constitutional protections.\textsuperscript{390} This substantially limited complainants’ access to the tools of discovery to attempt to find evidence of a notoriously difficult-to-prove claim: discrimination. In the post-Kiobel world, the ability of an ATS litigant to get to discovery has been significantly curtailed. As in Iqbal—and its predecessor, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly—establishing a “plausible” claim, such as discrimination, anti-competitive practices, or purposeful provision of aid and resources in furtherance of human rights abuses, against the individuals in charge of entities that are as complicated as the U.S. government and most transnational corporations, has now become even more difficult.\textsuperscript{391}

Considering the implications of this decision, further questions arise: What effect would the opposite result have yielded? How could the Second Circuit have perhaps come to the same ultimate conclusion without completely abandoning any form of corporate liability under the ATS? The answers to these questions and their impact on the current state of ATS litigation will be discussed next.

\textbf{B. Alternative Solutions}

The decision in \textit{Kiobel} is the most extreme of any solution that the Second Circuit could have contemplated. They decided the matter without any specific briefing from the parties on the matter of corporate liability and only a cursory mention of the issue occurring late and covering barely two pages of RDPC’s brief.\textsuperscript{392} This Comment proceeds to consider the alternative means by which

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the court could have concluded this case with varying degrees of impact on the state of ATS litigation.

Most obviously, the court simply could have dismissed on insufficiency of the pleadings. This is the view adopted by the concurring opinion. 393 Considering the fact that this was not part of the question certified for interlocutory appeal by Judge Wood from the Southern District of New York, 394 it may seem inappropriate for the appellate court to engage in the factual inquiry. Yet, the concurrence also handles this argument. An order certifying questions for the appellate court focuses more on the order and not the question, as “it is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court.” 395

Another alternative is to follow the approach and conclusions of the district court in this case by analyzing the particular and allegedly violated norms to determine whether they have the sufficient specificity in international law to be cognizable under the ATS. The district court held that wanton destruction of real and personal property, forced exile, and extrajudicial killing were not sufficiently defined; while also holding that torture, arbitrary detention, and crimes against humanity were. 396 Just as easily and in a significantly less extreme manner, the Second Circuit could have examined international law to determine whether the violations alleged in the multiple counts of the complaint were actually “defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” recognized at the time of the ATS’s enactment. 397 Instead of slamming the door shut on all forms of corporate liability, the court could have followed prior practice and looked to the substantive norms being alleged to decide the case.

Alternatively, the court also could have cleared up the murky and contentious state of aiding and abetting corporate liability theories in the opinions of this circuit and others. Judge Leval contends that they should follow the purposeful standard as articulated in *Talisman*. 398 This approach

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393 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 188 (Leval, J., concurring).
394 *Id.* at 124 (majority opinion).
395 *Id.* at 191 n.52 (Leval, J., concurring) (quoting Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 95 (2d Cir. 2004)).
398 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 192–93 (Leval, J., concurring).
would affect only the second major holding of the majority. In *Talisman*, the majority primarily looked to Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in *Khulumani* to determine whether the source of the standard for aiding and abetting liability should derive from domestic law or international law. With this approach, the *Kiobel* court’s first holding would go unaffected.

This approach employed by Judge Katzmann and the *Talisman* majority, although not as detailed as the *Kiobel* discussion, is similar and pertinent to this case. Judge Katzmann wrote that the Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that “the scope of the [ATS’s] jurisdictional grant should be determined by reference to international law.” The first part of the majority’s reasoning does not deviate from this practice. The *Kiobel* majority cited to the exact quoted language above in coming to its first holding that international law itself governs the scope of international law as applied under the ATS’s jurisdictional requirement that courts look to the law of nations.

Thus, the court could then move to an analysis of the standard to be met in actions for aiding and abetting liability. Specifically, they could have more clearly defined whether the mens rea standard in these actions is knowledge that actions taken would further human rights violations or a purpose to do so. Although the knowledge standard has been evidenced in international tribunal proceedings, it is most likely that the court, like the concurring opinion, would follow the arguments of Judge Katzmann in *Khulumani* and *Talisman* and adopt the purposeful standard. This has an additional advantage to the critics of ATS litigation generally.

The use of a higher standard of mens rea in complicity liability could stem the fears of some in the business community that the ATS intrudes too much in a corporation’s business activities and interactions with foreign entities. RDPC, arguing that private aiding and abetting liability should not be recognized in

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399 This is the holding that ultimately provides the court’s conclusion—that corporations are not liable under the ATS. See supra Part II.B.
400 Judge Katzmann reasoned in his *Khulumani* concurrence that the source of the aiding and abetting liability standard derived from international law. *Khulumani* v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring).
401 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009).
402 *Khulumani*, 504 F.3d at 269 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
403 *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 128.
405 See *Furundžija*, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, ¶ 117.
this case, implied this concern: “Blanket recognition of private liability for aiding and abetting or conspiracy would render all those who do business in foreign countries liable for the acts of those governments, so long as a plaintiff alleged some cooperation between the government and a private defendant.”\textsuperscript{406} One scholar has noted the impact and flood of litigation that widespread recognition of an aiding and abetting liability standard would have on enforcement of labor rights in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{407} Thus, the use of the higher purposeful standard would stem the fears of unwarranted intrusion in corporate affairs by a multitude of plaintiffs’ claims from around the world.

Yet another approach the Second Circuit could have employed in the \textit{Kiobel} decision is similar to that of their decision in \textit{Kadic v. Karadži}ći. Kadic, although not as clear as the \textit{Kiobel} majority made it seem, was an examination of whether private individuals not acting under color of state could be held liable for violations of international law under the ATS.\textsuperscript{408} The \textit{Kadic} holding did not necessarily validate the bright-line use of the ATS in actions against private individuals, but instead held that “certain forms of conduct” violated international norms regardless of status as state or non-state actors.\textsuperscript{409} The \textit{Kadic} court continued by looking to these “certain forms” such as genocide, war crimes, and other instances inflicting death, torture, and degrading treatment as relating to individual culpability for these actions.\textsuperscript{410} This raises an alternative treatment in that the court could specify which claims against corporations are sustainable under the ATS. This alternative would also clear up the fears, raised in \textit{Sosa}, inherent in requiring the district courts to interpret international law to find a cognizable norm. Moreover, this investigation would be substantially aided by looking to general principles to ascertain what conduct is abhorred in the domestic law spheres of the world. This would be a more appropriate and balanced approach to the issue of corporate liability than making an extraordinarily wide-reaching holding on an unbriefed issue while quelling some of the practical difficulties that the ATS jurisprudence presents to the lower courts.

The final and significantly broader ground upon which the Second Circuit could have ruled is that the court could have denied the availability of a cause

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{406} Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, \textit{supra} note 392, at 17.  
\textsuperscript{408} Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1995).  
\textsuperscript{409} \textit{Id.} at 239.  
\textsuperscript{410} \textit{Id.} at 241–44.}
of action for aiding and abetting under the ATS entirely. Unquestionably this would require an overturning of precedent in the circuit. Yet, it would not conflict with mandatory authority from the Supreme Court, which has never reached the issue. Additionally, this solution is no more extreme than simply denying relief against a whole class of defendants as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction and was actually a conclusion of a Southern District of New York ruling post-*Sosa*: “[T]he [ATS] presently does not provide for aider and abettor liability, and this Court will not write it into the statute.”

Although the court could not have effectuated it, one more solution to this problem lurks in ATS litigation and is actually hinted at by the majority in *Kiobel*. The majority wrote, in conclusion, “[N]othing in this opinion limits or forecloses corporate liability other than the ATS—including the domestic statutes of other States—and nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses Congress from amending the ATS to bring corporate defendants within our jurisdiction.” From this, it is clear that a congressional mandate could bring corporations back within the scope of the ATS. This is not as unlikely a scenario as it may seem. Congress has previously codified at least one violation of international norms beyond the three recognized paradigms, which served as the basis of the *Sosa* decision—the Torture Victim Protection Act. Yet, it is also clear that pro-corporate interest lobbying efforts would not sit quietly while Congress attempted to provide a means of possible worldwide corporate liability in U.S. courts.

C. Best Alternative Solution and the Future of ATS Corporate Litigation

The final conclusion of this Comment is that the best alternative method by which the Second Circuit could have resolved *Kiobel*—instead of erecting an artificial jurisdictional barrier—is the application of general principles of law recognized by the world’s legal systems. In fact, in a post-*Kiobel* case, the D.C. Circuit endorsed the application of general principles in its well-researched and lengthy opinion in *Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.* This conclusion does not run counter to either the United States’ practice of holding

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411 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009).
corporations liable for their torts, or with the world’s recognition that this liability exists and is in the best interest of protecting victims of tortious injury. Instead, the court has allowed for the possibilities presented by Judge Leval’s slippery slope.\textsuperscript{416} Although the results may not be as extreme as Leval posited, the potential for abuse of \textit{Kiobel}'s conclusion is most certainly possible. The majority attempts to mitigate this consequence by pointing back to their contention that individuals in the corporate structure responsible for human rights abuses could be held liable.\textsuperscript{417}

Yet, the deterrent effect of this holding is quite weak considering the massive amount of discovery and litigation involved in suits against transnational corporations and the difficulty in having enough information to allege which exact officer or manager was responsible for authorizing an action leading to an international law violation at the motion to dismiss stage, notwithstanding the increasing difficulty of proving it later in the case. Adding to this difficulty is the fact that officers and directors change with some frequency in the corporate arena. The responsible defendant may be far removed from the corporation and information may no longer be available to prove the claim. Thus, the potential for abuse is not as mitigated as the majority would like to argue.

The use of general principles to allow for corporate liability combined with the purposeful standard from \textit{Talisman} leads to the best balancing of the forces at play in ATS litigation. The use of a higher mens rea standard stands as a substantial and fair barrier to curb the fears of the business community concerning unwarranted judicial interference in their foreign business dealings. Yet, for plaintiffs crossing the \textit{Talisman} barrier with the most heinous of human rights and international law violations, the path to relief would remain open under this approach; whereas, under the \textit{Kiobel} holding, these most terrible violations will go unpunished.

Future litigation of this issue and others in U.S. courts’ determinations of international law must look to general principles as a source. As the worldwide trend in international law is toward increased protection of human rights, increasingly more secondary procedural and minor issues will arise.\textsuperscript{418}

\textsuperscript{416} See \textit{Kiobel}, 621 F.3d at 149–50, 155–58 (Leval, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{417} Id. at 149 (majority opinion).
\textsuperscript{418} See \textit{Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States} § 102, cmt. (l), at 28 (1987) (noting that general principles can be “resorted to for developing international law interstitially in special circumstances”).
principles of law can be the tool used by courts to accommodate the rise of these issues. Moreover, general principles were formulated to do just this, and their importance will only increase in future suits under the United States’ “legal Lohengrin”—the Alien Tort Statute. For the United States—where a revolution in human rights litigation was sparked by *Filartiga*—to deny compensation to plaintiffs injured by the most heinous of international law violations because of legal incapacity of juridical entities is entirely inconsistent with general principles of law and deals a significant blow to the vindication of human rights in U.S. courts.

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419 Bassiouni, *supra* note 177, at 769.

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